This day last year we were celebrating. We had witnessed a historic agreement being signed after superhuman efforts by all political parties with able assistance from the two leaders, Blair and Ahern. All looked set for a new era on our island.
A year has gone by quickly and we could be forgiven for believing that nothing has happened on the implementation side since then. But of course that would most certainly not be true. Indeed one only has to read Thursday's Ahern/Blair declaration to fully appreciate how far advanced the lengthy and complex process is, the constitutional changes, the Assembly elections, the prisoner releases, the human-rights and policing commissions.
The participants always knew that the implementation of the agreement would be the most difficult. There was always the temptation to leave the thorny issue of decommissioning until the end, on the basis that an unstoppable momentum would have built up that no one would have any choice but to begin.
A little less than a year ago I wrote about removing decommissioning from the political agenda. At that time there were three major arguments in favour of that approach: that paramilitary organisations have, historically, only handed over their guns following their military defeat; that the complete decommissioning of paramilitary weapons would be impossible to verify; and that even if all the weapons were destroyed rearming would not be difficult.
But it stayed on the agenda. The unionists were unwilling to allow it to slip or to allow the full two-year span built into the Belfast Agreement to elapse. They wanted a significant gesture and they believed they had been promised one by Tony Blair. At the same time Sinn Fein believed it had signed an agreement with a built-in delay before any weapons had to be handed over and was unwilling to put pressure on the IRA to decommission before the deadline.
It was a classic error made repeatedly in negotiations. The two sides had signed an agreement that looked like it solved their problems. But, because of assurances not included in the finished document and the leeway left by the language used in the deal, they thought they had agreed to two quite separate arrangements.
The fact that this had happened became clear very shortly after the agreement had been signed and then a period of kicking for touch ensued. No decisive action was taken by any of the parties. Decommissioning was neither removed from the agenda nor dealt with. It was allowed to fester for a year. Due to the lack of treatment it had become a virulent infection that threatened the peace process. This week the British Prime Minister and the Taoiseach donned their surgical gowns and engaged in prolonged surgery to remove the infection.
One of the key problems facing the negotiators is that, while they are undeniably skilled in the process, one of the key players is not. The IRA has spent the last quarter of a century not negotiating. In that time it has issued simple statements of intent which have been unbending. Over the last few years Sinn Fein has convinced the IRA of the value of a negotiated settlement.
But knowing that an agreement is the way forward and being able to create one is not the same thing. The IRA's midweek statement demonstrated its unfamiliarity with the process. Its language was equivocal in the extreme. It made reference to the desirability of a political solution but was so vague it was almost interpreted as a hardline response to the goings-on of the previous couple of days.
Charlie Bird, on Wednesday's News at One, had to go to great lengths to explain that he had talked to a reliable republican source who had assured him that this was not a statement of immobility.
The early details emerging from this week's talks of a possible agreement showed how complex these negotiations were. At first glance the situation seemed irreconcilable, with the unionists demanding decommissioning before Sinn Fein could join the executive and the paramilitaries refusing to hand over so much as a bullet before the executive and cross-Border bodies were in place.
What Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair had to work on was an examination of the agendas behind those stated positions. By analysing the motivation of both sides they moved towards a declaration that allowed both sides to get what they were really after.
During the week hints began circulating that a deal might be reached by Good Friday, that the two leaders had come up with a formula that would solve both sides' problems. And then, on Thursday, they revealed that they hadn't quite managed that. But the message was clear; they were nearly there, some crucial decisions had been made and the talks would reconvene on April 13th.
Many have questioned the decision to adjourn the talks, but there were good reasons for taking a break, not least the amount of effort put in over the last few days. Many of the participants, including the civil servants, had not slept for days. The party leaders were dealing not only with the negotiations but with the demands of their own parties. A mistake could have been terminal and lack of sleep made a mistake all the more likely.
Even against the background of near-total exhaustion the interim deal arrived at on Thursday is a clever piece of work, allowing both sides to win while neither has to substantially change its original, entrenched position. Even some of the language used like "collective act of reconciliation" showed the brains at the Department of Justice had not been fuzzed by tiredness. The declaration's key strength is that it keeps up the momentum needed to carry these talks to a successful conclusion by setting out the steps for continued progress.
I have been fulsome in my praise of Bertie Ahern's commitment to and work on the peace process in the past. At this stage I have to compliment Tony Blair on the work he has put in at a difficult time for him. He has members of his armed forces operating in the Balkans. Over the next week they will be engaged in the most hazardous form of aerial bombardment, ground attack. The fact that he has spent so much time in Ireland shows how seriously he is taking the peace process.
There is a duty on the Northern parties to respond positively to what is now an opportunity rather than an impasse. Breathing space has been created by the Herculean efforts of the last week; they now must use that space to go back to their parties and resolve any internal difficulties. On April 13th they must come back to the negotiating table not only refreshed but knowing that they have aligned their parties behind them. There can be no room for good luck on the 13th, just common sense and a will to succeed.