The transition from sectarian conflict to peaceful society in the North thatthe Belfast Agreement was meant to facilitate has not happened, writesDenis Kennedy
The black hole at the centre of the so-called peace process becomes ever more apparent, as hopes based on the Belfast Agreement continue to be jeopardised by the British government's readiness to tolerate the existence of terrorist armies on its territory and to embrace in government those inextricably tied to one of them.
The most Mr Blair had to say on that in the recent House of Commons debate was that these organisations "should be stood down as soon as possible". This is the Prime Minister of a democratic state talking about criminals engaged in an armed conspiracy to overthrow that state. Why the decorous term "stood down", and what does "as soon as possible" mean? Is it not possible now, and who decides when it will be possible?
Close study of Hansard for Wednesday of last week is a depressing exercise. Clearly Mr Blair does not regard the illegal possession of lethal weapons as a threat of violence. It seems it is only the acquisition of new weapons or training and targeting that will, in future, bring a slap on the wrist from the affable Dr Reid. The continued existence of subversive groups holding illegal arms is not therefore going to bring down the wrath of Dr Reid in his promised sterner mode.
It not the existence of the IRA or other paramilitaries which Mr Blair finds intolerable, it is only their involvement in recent sectarian disturbances. Amazingly, Mr Blair appears to think that, apart from these recent transgressions, paramilitaries have ceased violence, for he told the House that "It is no longer sufficient just that there should be no terrorist violence. We have to be clear that preparations for violence have also ceased." Apparently the nightly criminal, sometimes murderous, assaults carried out by paramilitaries to enforce their ghetto authority do not count as "violence".
Does all this matter? The agreement itself was based on double-think and double-talk, and as Mr Blair pointed out, it has brought enormous benefits - the institutions are in place and the violence is much less than it was. Such fudges of principle may be inevitable elements in a painful transition from sectarian conflict to peaceful society?
Perhaps, but only if we are indeed in such a transition. The communal hatred that drives people in several parts of Belfast, Antrim and elsewhere to attack each other's homes and persons does not suggest so. Neither does the real possibility that Sinn Féin and the DUP will be the leading parties at Stormont within 10 months. Nor the frightening segregation of many areas into sectarian ghettos. Nationalist and unionist may appear to be working together in the Executive, and at local level, but their contrasting interpetations of and expectations from the agreement are more and more stark.
Mark Durkan, in The Irish Times on the day of the Westminster debate gave a startling indication of this. He wrote "The SDLP is . . . concerned at the impression of unilateralism created by a statement by the British government in the House of Commons". The British government is the sovereign authority in Northern Ireland, is directly responsible for law and order, but the SDLP leader seems to think otherwise.
He is interpreting the agreement as not just saying that London should consult Dublin on Northern Ireland, but that it must not even give the impression of exercising its authority there "unilaterally".
The implication is that there is now joint authority over Northern Ireland, despite the repeated affirmation in the agreement that Northern Ireland is legitimately part of the United Kingdom, and the sovereign government that of the United Kingdom.
Dr Reid called the recent IRA apology "a step in the right direction", and even more effusive welcomes have been accorded IRA acts of decommissioning. But is it not naive to see these simply as steps in the right direction?
The two instances of decommissioning have been on the IRA's terms, at the IRA's discretion. The apology was like that of a legitimate government expressing regret for civilian casualties in a just war. These elements are part of the sustained campaign to portray 30 years of IRA terrorism as a legitimate struggle for equality, justice and Irish national rights rather than evidence of transition to peaceful politics.
The agreement, in all its ambivalence, was presented and sold as an exercise to facilitate the transition of terrorists away from armed force and into democratic politics, and to help nationalists accept fully the consent principle and live with guaranteed equality within the United Kingdom.
More than four years later the IRA is still an active armed terrorist army, as are the loyalists. Nationalists are more, not less nationalist, and on the unionist side the moderates are under siege from the DUP.
In north and east Belfast the tribal battle is fought out on the streets. This is not what was meant to happen.
As an Irish Times editorial said (21/07/02) "wholehearted and complete renunciation of violence, full decommissioning and participation in the new policing structures by republicans would transform the situation.
"It would strengthen the institutions, steady the unionist middle ground and, indeed, it would save lives." That was what was meant to happen. That was meant to be the price republicans had to pay for their seat at the democratic table. The failure of Mr Blair, and indeed of Mr Ahern, to insist on that price being paid is why there is a black hole at the centre of the "peace process".
Dennis Kennedy is a historian and commentator