LAST WEEK I set out here a method involving single-seat constituencies, some with additional members by which our Dáil electoral system might be reformed in a manner that might be acceptable to the electorate and TDs who would have to endorse it.
On the size of the Dáil, our two Constitutions, of 1922 and 1937 provided that it should lie between one TD for every 20,000 and 30,000 people and between 1923 and 1977 it was the practice of all governments to maintain a ratio of one TD per 20,000 people. For this purpose the size of the Dáil was adjusted five times, first downwards and then upwards to reflect fluctuations in our population.
Although since 1979 our population has grown by one quarter, no further increase in the size of the Dáil has been legislated for during the past 30 years with the result that this ratio now stands at one TD per 25,400 people.
Accordingly the Constitution would now permit a reduction but not to a figure below 140 Dáil members.
Would my proposed Dáil reform require a constitutional referendum? I believe it might not.
Article 16.3.2 of the Constitution reads: “The members [of the Dáil] shall be elected on the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.” The use of the definite article before the word “system” in this English version could, perhaps, be read as implying a requirement to employ the existing system of proportional representation.
But it is, of course, the Irish version of the Constitution that has to be interpreted by the courts and the plural form of the Irish version “do réir na h-ionadaíochta cionúire” clearly envisages a multiplicity of forms of proportional representation, and so would not, I feel involve a requirement to use only the existing PR system.
However, there could conceivably be a constitutional issue in relation to the fact that under the system proposed in last week’s article, a half of the constituency would have one, and the other half would have two TDs after each election.
The system I proposed here last week would, in fact, be much more strictly proportional than the present system, which, while it is proportional within each constituency at the national level, can yield heavily disproportional results in terms of overall Dáil membership.
For example, in the 2002 election, Fianna Fáil’s share of contested seats was 17 per cent greater and Fine Gael’s share was 17 per cent less than these two parties’ proportions of first preference votes. Next, what advantages and disadvantages would the proposed reformed system bring? For the electorate, voters would be much closer to their TDs, because the 100 new single-seat constituencies would be between one third and one half the size of the present 43 multi-seat ones.
Next, in choosing between the single candidates that each party would put forward, voters would continue to use the alternative voting system, (1, 2, 3 in the order of your choice), with the consequence that the candidate they elected would genuinely reflect the preferences of a majority of constituents.
There would be more continuity among the TDs elected in the 100 single-seats – but less continuity among the additional TDs who would be elected in half of the 100 constituencies.
The voters would, of course, lose their power to choose between several candidates at present put forward by the two larger parties.
As for the TDs, those directly elected from the larger parties would join those of smaller parties today in having much greater security of tenure, through not being subject to being replaced in elections by party colleagues.
During the past half-century two-thirds of defeated Fianna Fáil TDs lost their seats to members of their own party rather than to the Opposition. By thus gratuitously trebling their insecurity the present system has hugely intensified the paranoia of such TDs. And the same is true, albeit to a lesser extent, in the case of Fine Gael TDs, who also lose seats to members of their own party.
The two larger parties would, however, lose the “seat bonuses”, (excess of share of seats over share of seats over votes), which they have generally, but not always, enjoyed, (See Fine Gael’s outcome in 2002).
A growing Labour Party, which in order to expand within the present electoral system will in future have to present more than one candidate in a range of constituencies, would also benefit from not finding itself dragged into the kind of intra-party infighting which, as a small party, normally fielding only a single candidate in multi-seat constituencies, they have hitherto been able to avoid.
As for the smaller parties, they would be guaranteed fair representation, which at present they sometimes fail to secure because the larger parties often win a disproportionate number of seats.
The losers in all this might be Independents, some of whom, in return for promises of future support in Dáil votes, in return secure disproportionate benefits for their constituencies, which distorts the equitable distribution of national resources. However, a number of Independents might protect their position by forming a loose group for electoral purposes.
The political system generally would benefit greatly from a reform of the kind proposed.
Within the present system many TDs have been forced to neglect their key legislative role because of the need to spend most of their time protecting their seats not just from TDs and candidates of other parties, but most of all from competitors within their own party.