Tiredness and fatigue along with diminished co-operation between crew members at critical times has been blamed for a serious incident involving an Irish cargo aircraft at Glasgow airport last year.
The UK’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) has published its final report into the February 23rd incident involving an ATR-42-300 turboprop operated by Dublin-based Air Contractors Ltd.
The Newcastle to Glasgow flight was the last of three legs of a journey the crew was scheduled to carry out. They flew from Manchester to Paris the previous night and from there to Newcastle, before departing again for Glasgow.
During the flight’s approach to Glasgow, the aircraft slowed and the stall alert activated. Corrective action then led to an overspeed. Following further corrective action, the speed reduced close to a second stall alert.
At one point, the co-pilot said to the commander: “Fly the aircraft (expletive).” The commander almost immediately pitched the aircraft nose down and applied almost to full power saying: “I’ve got it, I’ve got it, don’t worry.”
The co-pilot also suggested “put the autopilot in” to which the commander replied “shhhh, just steady on”. An air traffic controller called and asked if the aircraft was still on frequency and the co-pilot replied: “Affirm, stand by, we’ve just got – eh – a few problems,” before advising the controller that the problem had been resolved and he would contact the tower.
At touchdown, another warning activated, however “the flight crew did not action the associated procedure”. An engineer met the aircraft and was told by the commander that there had been a problem with the autopilot. The co-pilot contradicted this and said the autopilot was not faulty, recommending that the flight recorder should be preserved.
Investigators also established that it was the co-pilot who contacted the company’s flight safety department, prompting an internal investigation. The company then informed the Air Accident Investigation Unit in Ireland on February 23rd and the AAIB was informed a day later.
The AAIB report states: “The appropriate airspeed was not maintained during the approach because standard operating procedures were not observed, monitoring was not effective and there was diminished crew co-operation during recovery actions.
“Standard calls and responses were not always carried out correctly. He [commander] engaged in conversation on non- operational topics below 10,000 feet and did not always use standard radiotelephony phrases.
“Before his flying duty, he drove approximately 2 hrs and 45 minutes to his base. Consequently, knowingly or not, he may have been tired or fatigued,” the report states.