India's announcement that it will not help evacuate more than 30,000 Sri Lankan soldiers encircled by elements of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been accompanied by a statement that no specific request of this nature was made by Sri Lankan authorities. There is little doubt however that India was sounded out on the matter and has refused, for a number of reasons, to become involved.
The issue of Tamil separatism has been one of extreme difficulty for India in the past. Despite denials at the time, it has emerged that India was involved in supporting the Tamil rebels with arms and expertise in the early 1980s. The Tamil Tigers' leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, moved to live in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu. In a major change of direction in 1987, India, in a pact with the Sri Lankan government, sent troops to fight Tamil separatists, disengaging in 1990 and leaving large areas of northern Sri Lanka under LTTE control. A year later the former Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, lost his life to a suicide bomber believed to have been a member of the LTTE and Mr Prabhakaran was named among the prime suspects in the case. It seems almost certain that the Congress party of which Mr Gandhi was leader, will now raise major objections to the stand taken by Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee's BJP-led coalition on the current Sri Lankan crisis.
The issue also has ramifications for Mr Vajpayee's government. His majority is slim and an essential element in its continued existence has been the presence of members of the DMK party from Tamil Nadu who have ethnic sympathies with the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The BJP and the DMK have also struck an alliance at regional level and will fight an election together in Tamil Nadu later this year.
Under these circumstances, the Sri Lankan government can expect little support of consequence from India, despite pressure that may come from Congress party members for whom the assassination of Mr Gandhi remains a burning issue. For Sri Lanka's president, Ms Chandrika Kumaratunga, the fall of the crucial Elephant Pass in the north of the country late last month and the encircling of so many members of the armed forces, represents an extraordinary military and political setback. In December 1995 the LTTE appeared defeated following the fall of Jaffna to government forces. The Sri Lankan army, two years later, was confident enough to give its biggest ground offensive the code name of "Operation Sure Victory."
Since then, the LTTE has painstakingly rebuilt its forces and now seems set to capture Jaffna once more. There is a danger moreover, that its latest military successes may encourage the LTTE to disengage from peace talks under Norwegian mediatorship. Few options, other than the military one, may be left open to Ms Kumaratunga. She may have to face, in the near future, not just the re-emergence of large rebel controlled areas in the north of the country, but also great instability throughout the whole island.