Russia's recognition deepens crisis

IN THE confrontation between Georgia's reckless provocation and Russia's utterly disproportionate response that has so rapidly…

IN THE confrontation between Georgia's reckless provocation and Russia's utterly disproportionate response that has so rapidly changed the strategic map of Europe this month, yesterday's decision by Russian president Dmitri Medvedev to recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states is a further escalation of the conflict.

It unacceptably violates the principle of territorial integrity that is one of the cornerstones of international law, which has been endorsed by successive UN Security Council resolutions on Georgia's sovereignty. And it is bound to set dangerous precedents elsewhere in Europe - not least in the Russian Federation itself where Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan demand similar independent status.

After the Georgians attacked South Ossetia on August 9th, the swift and colossal Russian counter-attack clearly indicated a determination to prevent neighbouring states in its "near abroad" drawing closer to western military and political alliances. Georgia exemplified the trend because of its close association with the United States and the Bush administration, making it the perfect target for a reassertive Russian policy. Having gambled so much, Georgia promptly lost the military engagement, and then, lacking US military support, could only watch helplessly as Russian forces consolidated their presence, established buffer zones and helped expel Georgian citizens.

In crude power terms, yesterday's decision would seem to follow naturally from such brutal military behaviour. But recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states in fact breaks fundamental norms of co-operation and negotiation painstakingly established in Europe since the end of the Cold War and resurrects crucial elements of that geopolitical conflict. The political and diplomatic logic involved heralds a souring of relations between Russia and the rest of Europe, threatening to break links and bridges built up with the European Union and Nato. Thus the military disproportionality is reproduced on the political side. This will force Russia's European interlocutors and the United States to respond in kind. It is a bleak prospect for the coming months and badly needs to be calmed down.

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This escalation of tension draws on much longer processes of change. Russia's recovery from the collapse of the Soviet Union under Vladimir Putin was immensely aided by the boom in world oil prices. European Union states have been too slow to see the need for a long-term adaptation to the change through widening agreements on security, energy and common decision-making. That oversight is now being bluntly exposed. Under President Bush, the US has tried to contain Russian power by Nato enlargement, a provocative and inappropriate policy relying too much on military rather than political means. But former members of the Soviet bloc understandably see a dire threat to their own security after these events from an assertive Russia which resents their freedom. Getting the balance right between politics and security concerns in Europe has suddenly become much more difficult.