OPINION:Ireland is in danger of squandering its valued status as a neutral country within the EU, writes Tom Clonan
OPTING OUT of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy would not enhance Ireland's status as a neutral country. But it would neutralise it.
A few days ago I attended a briefing in Brussels on the EU's defence and security policy and it's clear that our EU partners are bewildered at our seeming desire to dispense with Ireland's unique influence as a neutral member state at the heart of the EU's evolving defence and security mechanisms.
They are also puzzled at Ireland's apparent irrational fear of conscription into a non-existent EU army. One senior EU official described the reported concerns of the Irish public in relation to conscription and loss of neutral status as "irrational - a schizophrenic position which would effectively muzzle Ireland's neutrality at a time of great importance for neutral states . . ."
The EU is now busy contemplating the security challenges that confront the union for the next 20 years or so.
Ireland has a major vested interest as a neutral state in remaining central to the negotiation of such vital strategic policy interests. Security opt-outs would threaten effectively to end Ireland's proud tradition of international peacekeeping and would deny Irish citizens their unique voice at the heart of the EU's defence and security decision-making structures.
The EU's security and defence strategy began its evolution in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. The EU moved to apply so-called hard and soft power solutions to resolving conflicts and promoting peace.
In 2003, an EU security strategy identified five key threats to Europe. These included the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) within the developing world, the spread of global terrorism, the resurgence of regional conflicts, the problems arising from "failed" states and the threat to domestic security posed by organised crime. The strategy would appear to have been prescient.
The proliferation of WMDs, and nuclear weapons in particular, has preoccupied the EU and US since 2003, with much focus on the acquisition and development of such weapon systems by states such as North Korea, Iran and Pakistan.
Global terror - as evidenced recently by events in Mumbai - remains a significant threat to domestic security within states, with inter-state stability also affected.
The military intervention by Russia in Georgia in August was a classic example of the type of resurgent regional conflict hypothesised by the EU in 2003.
The problems posed by "failed" states are amply illustrated today as the EU deploys its first naval taskforce to tackle piracy off the Somali coast. The security challenges faced by individual EU states arising from organised crime have also been evident.
While the US has responded to the same problems with greater use of so-called hard, ie military power, the EU has chosen a more eclectic mix of soft and hard power responses - diplomatic, economic and aid responses along with some military missions.
According to one senior EU official: "The US foreign policy toolbox has been all hammers of late, while the EU toolbox has consisted of screwdrivers, pliers and glue for binding people together through trade and mutual dependence."
The problem with such responses is that they tend, on the whole, to be low-key. The EU's interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Macedonia, have been overwhelmingly successful at resolving conflict and promoting democratic structures and economic development.
The EU has also launched civilian, military and security missions to the Palestinian Authority. Similar missions are at work in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The EU also deployed troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo to support the UN in supporting the electoral process there. Most recently, the EU has deployed the Irish-led EUfor Chad military mission to Chad and the Central African Republic.
The participation of Ireland in practically all of these missions has been consistent with our stated policy of neutrality. Our participation in these missions and initiatives has also been wholly consistent with our traditional support for the UN - under whose security council mandate many of these initiatives have been sanctioned.
The participation by the Irish in these initiatives - as force members in ground operations or at the planning phases at the EU Military Staffs and elsewhere - is noted and much commented upon by our EU partners.
It is held within the EU as an example of the way in which a relatively small, neutral state can exercise critical levels of control over EU foreign and security policy decisions.
The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty as they apply to defence and security would copper-fasten the influence and power of veto that the Irish would have over EU security and defence policies.
In any possible rerun of the Lisbon Treaty referendum, security opt-outs would reduce our involvement at this level of decision-making to the role of mere observers, along with non-participation in UN-mandated EU missions.
Dr Tom Clonan is the Irish TimesSecurity Analyst. John Waters is on leave