AFGHANISTAN’S DECISION to abandon the second round of its presidential vote on November 7th had become inevitable, a recognition of the reality that a rerun would have been a pointless and potentially bloody charade. The withdrawal at the weekend of opposition candidate Abdullah Abdullah over the refusal of President Hamid Karzai to reform the Independent Election Commission (IEC) had opened up the prospect of a Soviet-style single-candidate ballot conducted in the likely face of rampant voter apathy, more of the widespread electoral fraud that characterised the June first round, and rising violence from Taliban insurgents.
The US and western allies were understandably concerned that they could have been forced to sacrifice more troop deaths for a meaningless poll – military casualties are already at record levels this year, with October the bloodiest month of the eight-year war for US forces. And that kind of poll would have done nothing for the political authority of a deeply compromised Mr Karzai, whose renewed mandate, formally confirmed yesterday by the IEC, is the palest shadow of the genuine landslide he won in 2004.
In truth, even before Dr Abdullah’s withdrawal, the result of the election largely was a foregone conclusion. It had become a sideshow to the underlying challenge to the country’s politics: devise a viable political programme to reform weak and discredited political institutions and create the political means to carry it through. Both are critical to transforming a war that cannot be won by military means alone, a reality that President Obama is certainly weighing in his current strategic review of whether to add a further 40,000 troops to the 68,000-strong US contingent.
That reality requires Afghanistan’s friends in the international community to persuade “re-elected” Mr Karzai to relinquish significant personal power, a prospect that – paradoxically – should be facilitated politically by the dubious nature of his re-election and weakened mandate. It means dealing with issues such as the direct election of regional governors, the strengthening of local government and parliament, particularly in giving the latter the right to elect the prime minister and cabinet, changing the ethnic balance of the armed and police forces, curbing drug dealing and corruption, and funding programmes aimed at weaning Taliban foot soldiers away from violence. It will mean beginning to talk also to the less ideologically committed sections of the Taliban leadership.
Such challenges are almost certainly beyond an enfeebled Mr Karzai unless he can bring Dr Abdullah into government. But it is a prospect that is not looking good. On Sunday the president ruled out a coalition, although Dr Abdullah, whose standing has been much enhanced, left the door open for future discussions. The latter’s support base among the minority Tajik population and the former guerillas of the Northern Alliance would complement Mr Karzai’s Pashtun roots in the south and is crucial to legitimising both the government and the viability of a joint campaign against the Taliban.