With three weeks to go before the Bosnian general election, all the signs are that this brave attempt to put the seal on the Dayton agreements will end in fiasco. There has been little or no willingness by the political parties to address economic or social issues. Instead, the emphasis has been put on sectional interests or clearing up the endless array of matters outstanding from the conflict, such as the return of refugees. Tensions between the ethnic groups are stubbornly entrenched, and a number of incidents strongly suggest that the urge to return to open warfare to regain territory is not far below the surface in sections of all three communities.
On the positive side, the fact that the killing has ceased and there are no movements of rival forces offers some hope of improvement. But many of the targets set at Dayton have been deliberately flouted, including the commitment to release all prisoners, which has been slowly and reluctantly complied with and has not yet been completed nearly six months after the deadline at the end of January. The case of Dugi Dio - a Moslem village just inside the area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs - is symbolic of the present mood: plans to fortify it and to link it by road with a Moslem stronghold on the other side of the ethnic frontier are regarded by the international force as potentially designed for aggressive purposes.
So soon after the bloody reality of ethnic cleansing, a revival of multi ethnic politics would be beyond any rational expectation. But the agreed Dayton formula has so far failed to permeate the public consciousness and develop a momentum of its own. The notion that its carefully balanced provisions can be altered to strengthen the position of one or other of the ethnic groups underlies the slow progress in making it effective.
Not the smallest effect of the current political lethargy is the stagnation of economic reconstruction. The total cost of making good the destruction in Bosnia is estimated at close to £80 billion but while some major projects have been successfully completed, many that involve cross community acquiescence have been subjected to local obstruction even when they are clearly of equal benefit to all ethnic groups. Some of the objections are political: the Bosnian Serbs are not anxious to make economic commitments that recognise their inclusion in the Bosnian federation, and as a result have received only a fraction of the available aid. But in other eases the motivation appears to be a simple refusal to co operate at local level, regardless of what has been agreed generally by the political leaders.
With few signs of political progress, the willingness of investors to support the hesitant establishment of a unified federation in Bosnia is likely to diminish. The vicious circle by which economic development is needed to underpin political confidence but is prevented by the lack of political will could frustrate the patient efforts of the international community to draw a line under hostilities and promote a democratic solution. The election on September 14th will be a landmark in those attempts, but at this point it seems more likely to consolidate the bitterness of the war than open the way to a new era of co operation.