NATO's Dilemma In Kosovo

Moves towards peace in Kosovo could hardly have been made against a grimmer background than that of the two recent massacres …

Moves towards peace in Kosovo could hardly have been made against a grimmer background than that of the two recent massacres of ethnic Albanians in which 70 people have died. The forces controlled by Mr Slobodan Milosevic and those of the Kosovo Liberation Army now have a mere six days to comply with the ultimatum from the Contact Group and start peace talks at Rambouillet near Paris. After that they will have a week, or two weeks at the outside, to come to an agreement and end the bloodshed.

Neither side will get what it wants. The KLA must accept a deal which falls short of its aim of total independence. Mr Milosevic must withdraw his brutal police from the region and call the Yugoslav army back to barracks. The result is likely to be a Kosovo which is nominally under Belgrade's control but in which the ethnic Albanian majority has political control while the military ring is held by a large, perhaps 20,000-strong, international force, most probably from NATO.

It is not yet clear whether either side in the conflict is prepared for such a significant lowering of its aspirations nor is it certain what action will be taken, and by whom, should the latest ultimatum be ignored. Russia, traditional ally of Serbia, has supported the ultimatum but is virulently opposed to the use of force by NATO in order to implement it. The United States has shown a distinct reticence about sending its troops into Kosovo as part of a peacekeeping force. The secretary general of the United Nations, Mr Kofi Annan, supports the use of force but NATO itself would face major problems should it have to resort to the ultimate sanction. It must be seen to act even-handedly in such a situation but this may not be possible.

Action against Mr Milosevic and his forces would be fairly simple. There are many genuine military targets which could be subjected to aerial bombardment. It should be remembered, however, that the recent Anglo-American venture in Iraq has shown the much-vaunted accuracy of so-called "smart" weapons may be considerably exaggerated. Behind the callous term "collateral damage" lies the grief and agony of innocent civilians suffering from accidental attack. Aerial bombardment must be completely ruled out as a militarily effective or morally acceptable measure against the KLA. Its fighters live amongst the people and it would be no accident should the bombing of villages kill and maim the innocent.

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An arms embargo against the KLA has been mooted but in the mountainous terrain along which the border between Albania and Kosovo runs this would be a futile policy. Western intelligence sources claim that organised criminal groups run by Albanians in western Europe and the United States have been funding KLA operations and have suggested freezing bank accounts as a possible sanction. But organisations which are past masters at money laundering would quickly find a way around this.

The threat of force by NATO is therefore likely to be more effective against Mr Milosevic than against the KLA. In the meantime there is still hope, however slight, that an agreement can be reached without resort to armed force.