Germany and France have been the motive force behind European integration. But French and German attitudes to the future of Europe are not identical. Like the Germans, the French favour greater integration, but they are less enthusiastic about federal models, shying away from that word unless it is carefully qualified as a federation "of nation-states".
In particular, France, with its presidential constitution and relatively weak National Assembly, has never been enthusiastic about extending the role of the European Parliament.
And France is also more reticent than Germany about the timetable for enlargement of the Union, especially as it has concerns about the impact of enlargement on some sectors of the French economy, in particular, agriculture. When, in the early part of the last decade, trade agreements were negotiated with the newly liberated eastern European countries, France was the most reluctant to open the EU borders to these countries' exports, especially, but not only, their farm products.
Last week in this column I set out the recently-expressed "personal views" of the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, on the future of the European Union. Three days later, in a speech to the French Assembly, the Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, presented his government's official view on these issues.
On the face of it, the general direction of French thinking as outlined in this speech may not appear greatly dissimilar to Fischer's private vision. For Jospin recognised, indeed emphasised, the need to face up to the enormous challenge of making an enlarged Union of perhaps 30 states work. He posed four rhetorical questions:
"Can a Union of 30 members really work? If yes, then how? Can an enlarged and necessarily heterogeneous group provide itself with a coherent and efficient economic and social policy? How are we to ensure that an enlarged Union does not become reduced to a mere free trade area, but remains a genuine community?"
Jospin had earlier described the European Union as being "far from a negation of the nation. Europe is its prolongation and its deepening" (that phrase sounds much better in French) and is a "growth space placed at the service of full employment and social cohesion".
When, having developed that theme at some length, Jospin came to the subject of the future of the Union, he started by speaking not of federation but of "reinforced co-operation" - an "approach that permits some states to go faster and further in the Union". This is, of course, the same concept of "flexibility" that is being pushed by Germany and it reflects a growing concern about Britain's hesitant stance, even under Tony Blair's more European leadership.
Jospin, indeed, described flexibility as "the means of pursuing - while avoiding the endless debate between federal and confederal models - the pragmatic approach that has always prevailed and was that of the founding fathers". He mentioned a number of ideas that have been put forward with a view to avoiding "a dilution or paralysis" of a greatly enlarged Union:
A profound reform of the Union's institutions, redefining the roles of the council, the parliament or the commission, even giving rise to the creation of new institutions; or perhaps the constitution by an advance guard of some countries of a federation of nation-states - a hard core, characterised by additional integration; or even the elaboration of a European constitution, redefining competences and procedures as between the Union and its member-states.
By this nuanced statement of official policy the French Prime Minister has sought to recover French leadership in Europe, which may have seemed to be slipping away to Germany.
I have set out this French view of the future of the European Union, because, together with the "personal" statement made by the German Foreign Minister three days earlier, it raises in very concrete terms the controversial European issue of "flexibility", the idea of a group of member-states moving ahead of some laggards by creating a new "core" federal institutional structure.
Basically this is all happening because the looming timetable for enlargement of the Union to the east is now catching up on the foot-dragging stance that has been forced on Britain's Labour governments by the abject failure of successive British administrations over three decades to face down what seems to be a growing xenophobic English nationalism.
The continental EU countries had hoped that this British neurosis would at last have been dealt with following the advent to power three years ago of a Europe-friendly Labour government. But since then they seem to have become increasingly disillusioned by Tony Blair's domestic strategy of kicking to touch on the European issue during his first term, in the hope of winning support for the adoption of the euro in a referendum a year or so after the next election.
And, as the prospect of enlargement comes ever closer, so do their fears of the consequences of a failure to reform radically the Union's institutional structure before new members join. They are worried lest the wider community might come to include new member-states which, whether because of nationalism or because of economic or administrative weakness, could undermine Europe's capacity to play an influential and constructive role on a world stage likely to be dominated by the United States, and later perhaps also by China and a resurgent Russia.
All this is unfortunate, for Germany and France may have become unduly pessimistic about the capacity of Tony Blair to win a post-election referendum - which, there is reason to believe, he is determined to do. Doubly unfortunate, perhaps, because by raising the controversial "flexibility" issue at this stage, they may have made success in such a referendum more difficult.
Ireland cannot on its own block the development of a core European federation: to attempt to do so would make us a pariah among our partners. And if Britain were to seek to do so, for us to join with our neighbour in what would almost certainly be a futile attempt would not be in our longterm interest.
We would have the invidious choice of remaining behind with what would probably be an isolated United Kingdom or else joining the federal core, thus widening, possibly irretrievably, the gap between ourselves and the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland.
The former line of action would effectively involve abandoning any chance of participating in the decisions that would affect our long-term future - for all key decisions would thereafter be taken by the core federation, from which we would be absent. The latter could put great difficulties in the way of building on the Belfast Agreement.
For Irish policy-makers this is a kind of nightmare scenario: potentially a stark choice between our European and Northern Ireland policies. Our long-term future may depend upon how wisely and skilfully we handle this challenge. Unhappily, as Prof Brigid Laffan has recently pointed out*, "The Irish [European policy-making] system is largely reactive and agenda-driven." And Prof Joe Lee, while, like Prof Laffan, he remarks on the widespread European recognition of the "political skills of Irish representatives in negotiating situations", also raises a question about "the calibre of conceptualisation of the Irish case before negotiations begin"**.
It now seems likely that in the next couple of years this issue of "flexibility" in the Union and the possible emergence of a powerful core federation at its heart may stretch to the limit the undoubted abilities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Cowen, and his team.
*Europe: The Irish Experience, Institute of European Affairs, 2000; p 135.
**Reflections On Ireland In The EEC, Professor Joseph Lee, Irish Council Of The European Movement, 1984; p 5.
gfitzgerald@irish-times.ie