Both the Dublin and London governments have accepted, reluctantly, that the Hillsborough declaration will not serve as a basis for resolving the impasse over paramilitary decommissioning and the establishment of a new executive in Northern Ireland. That they should have had to do so is regrettable. But it is an acknowledgement of real-politik in the aftermath of the formal rejection of the declaration by Sinn Fein and the PUP and the objections by the Alliance and by the Women's Coalition. It is difficult to know how the resumed talks this week are to make progress.
The declaration was an imaginative attempt to give both Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionists what they insist they need. It proposed that Sinn Fein Ministers would be allocated responsibilities in a shadow-executive before the IRA would put a quantity of armaments "beyond use". It envisaged a day of reconciliation at which point the executive would come fully into operation. If all of the contending parties were genuinely seeking a way forward without loss of face, it was thus on offer. Once again it seemed that the Ulster Unionists were prepared to be flexible. Sinn Fein and the IRA responded with a flat no.
The "Republican family" is seemingly unable, at this time, to come to terms with its own contradictions. It wants to participate in a democratically-elected administration but, at the same time, to retain a paramilitary option. Acres of often tortured language have been used to explain the significance of arms in Republican psychology, urging the two Governments to fashion some suitable accommodation to provide for this. Quite ingenious flexibilities have been advanced in response - the Hillsborough declaration being the most recent - while prisoners are released and other "confidence-building measures" are effected. But the IRA says never, no semtex, not a round of ammunition.
If the "Republican family" cannot get over this obstacle on the road towards full democracy which has been mapped out for them by the leadership of Sinn Fein, then they will have to remain outside any executive which may be formed. The question which the two Governments then have to decide is whether to press ahead with the formation of an executive without Sinn Fein participation or to put the process in cold-storage and to have the governance of Northern Ireland revert to the status quo ante. If the latter course is chosen, elements of the Belfast Agreement may begin to unravel and there will be the danger of a reversion to large-scale violence with the advent of the marching season and another potential crisis at Drumcree.
The search for peace, as it has been defined since the early years of the decade, has been posited on the assumption that any settlement would have to be inclusive. It would have to embrace those on the edges of the political spectrum and not just those in the centre. The Government earlier this week once again asserted this objective, stressing that it would not support the creation of an executive without Sinn Fein. But if the choice comes down to an executive without Sinn Fein or no executive at all, that position may have to be reconsidered. Can it be right that one party, a minority of a minority, should effectively be handed the power of veto over the wishes of the vast majority of the people for a return to full participative democracy?
The metaphor of the train leaving the station has been much quoted in this process. If a new, elected executive, committed exclusively to democratic and peaceful methods, were to set off now, Sinn Fein cannot be on board that train. But they might consider it opportune to order events so that they can join it down the line.