The fact that British forces were involved alongside the Americans in the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan from the start is hardly remarkable. Tony Blair has been vociferous in his support for the US.
However, much more surprising has been the French position. Not only is President Jacques Chirac squarely behind George Bush in the current military effort, but the French have pledged the eventual use of their own troops.
To be sure, the French took part in the US-led operation against Saddam Hussein's Iraq a decade ago. Yet they did so at the very last moment, and insisted their troops should remain under exclusive French control. Remarkably, no such tactics have been adopted this time.
French intellectuals and a few ministers in the Socialist-led government in Paris issued some jarring tones over the last few weeks but Chirac himself, the real heir to the old Gaullist anti-American tradition, quickly disowned them. The French position is partly related to the country's internal politics. But it also represents a fundamental shift, which will outlive the current preoccupation with bin Laden and his ilk.
Chirac would not be a true politician if he did not combine domestic advantages with long-term foreign policy considerations. When the terrorists struck in the US, Chirac was mired in a controversy over allegations of corruption at the time he was mayor of Paris.
The current crisis wiped out any media preoccupation with the scandal, and probably forever. France's constitution also gives the head of state specific powers over the military in emergency situations, allowing the man in the ElysΘe Palace to overshadow his government.
Chirac is confronting Prime Minister Lionel Jospin in the presidential elections next year. While Chirac toured the carnage in New York and talked to President Bush about an adequate response (incidentally a full week before Blair made the same pilgrimage), Jospin remained in Paris, tasked with handling the much less interesting discussions about a faltering French economy.
Opinion polls swiftly reflected this disparity in images: if the presidential elections were held now, Chirac would be assured his coveted re-election. But they are still months away, and a great deal can change.
However, the fundamental shift which Chirac has implemented in France's policy towards the US is probably permanent.
The French have realised for quite some time that their old instinct of pin-pricking Washington at any given opportunity, and of constantly trying to diminish US influence in Europe, brought diminishing returns. France, like all other Europeans, needs the US military's presence in Europe, if only because the Europeans are unlikely to invest much more money in their own defence.
The only outcome of France's perennial hostility towards the Americans was that the country was increasingly marginalised. Both the Germans and, of course, the British, claimed special military links with Washington; the French could promote particular issues in Europe, but frequently came up against a military obstacle which they were never able to overcome.
Chirac has tried in the past to bury this Gaullist tradition, most spectacularly when he probed the possibility of returning to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's integrated military command structure in 1997.
He was defeated by a combination of suspicion in Washington and a backlash from the political class in France. The terrorist crisis has finally given Chirac the possibility of escaping from this old French self-entrapment.
So, what do the French seek to achieve? In essence, to build their own "special relationship" with Washington. This will never be as close or as trusty as that enjoyed by Britain, but could put France in an equal position to that of Britain and Germany, at least in international security matters. The Americans always knew that, as valued as Britain's friendship could be, a close relationship with other key European allies is even better; now the White House has this opportunity offered on a French plate.
Closer co-operation with Washington will also dispel American suspicions about the European defence structure.
Far from slowing down the process of creating this structure, a co-operative link with Washington could advance Europe's military aspirations, just what Britain was able to achieve in the last few years. And trade disputes across the Atlantic could become more manageable if neither Paris nor Washington suspected each other's motives.
Given the history of the relationship between the two countries over the last few decades, this is nothing short of a revolution. And the first signs of this new French approach are already being felt throughout the EU.
At the meeting of the EU foreign ministers held earlier this week, the French put forward a plan designed to manage the transition following the departure of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The proposals range from emergency humanitarian aid for refugees and displaced persons to the co-ordination of international efforts to reconstruct a country ravaged by 25 years of conflict.
France is proposing the creation of a "permanent consultative framework" between the EU, the United States, the states neighbouring Afghanistan, as well as UN agencies and various relief organisations.
It would be a kind of contact group, like the one which functioned for several years for the former Yugoslavia. The function of this group would be to evaluate and better master the political, economic, and human consequences of the Afghan crisis.
By presenting this "action plan", France is pursuing several objectives: to highlight its own role in the current crisis, to give the impression of an international community acting together, to reposition the solution of the crisis in the framework of the United Nations, and to give the EU a role, namely that of providing assistance with reconstruction.
The EU foreign ministers failed to agree on any policy this week, but the French plan remains on the table, and is sure to be discussed again in the coming weeks. And it is equally certain French troops will become involved in the current military operations.
The Americans are unlikely to object to any of these moves, and Washington has not failed to notice their constructive, supporting role.
So, as the dust of war eventually settles, it will become clear that Osama bin Laden's crimes, in a curious way, have managed to accomplish what the end of the Cold War failed to achieve: a French-US reconciliation on principles which would have been inconceivable even a year ago.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London