The UK's political system can adjust to coalition governments – in the same way the Irish did decades ago, writes NOEL WHELAN
WITH IRISH politics stuck in a loop of recurring banking-related controversies, British politics again proved the more interesting this week and continues to throw up relevant talking points for our political system.
The British election was transformed last weekend when a series of polls showed a massive Liberal surge on the back of Nick Clegg’s winning performance in the first party leaders’ debate. The Liberal Democrats were measured with the largest support level of all three parties in some of these national polls.
Here in Ireland, some Labour Party politicians and commentators sought to read this Liberal Democrats phenomenon across to Ireland as a “third party” effect which could be replicated here when our election comes.
The phenomenon can more properly be attributed to the political volatility which the economic crisis has brought to all western democracies. It has generated an anti-politics or anti-establishment mood which has been particularly acute in Britain because of last year’s parliamentary expenses scandal.
As a fresh faced non-incumbent, Nick Clegg was well-positioned to argue against the traditional two-party divide, which has dominated British politics for a century. He attracted an element of the mood which propelled Barack Obama to power, although obviously in a more limited way. Certainly, the surprise dramatic increase in support for the Liberal Democrats has exposed the grossly disproportionate nature of the British first-past-the-post electoral system.
Assessing the impact of national poll movements on seat shares in British elections is particularly difficult. Not only must one factor in the crude nature of the electoral system, but also the regional concentrations in support for the parties and the recent redrawing of the electoral map.
A number of British media organisations and academic psephologists have designed “ready reckoners” to convert the national percentage support into likely seat numbers in the new parliament. It was startling to watch these converters reveal that, even if the Liberal Democrats ended up as the largest political party in vote terms, it could win no more than 120 of the 650 Westminster seats.
Having reached dizzy heights last weekend, the Liberal Democrat surge has abated somewhat. Clegg’s very inclusion in the first of the debates led inevitably to a jump in poll support for his party, but also precipitated an inevitable media backlash, particularly in the Tory press. The Liberal leader was unknown to most people in Britain nine days ago. Now every detail of his career, finances and family origins has been examined. Last Thursday, four British newspapers devoted front page space to stories designed to be detrimental to Clegg. He has become the target for attack.
The outcome of the second leaders’ debate on Thursday night was less clear cut. Clegg was still the best debater, but his impact was less dramatic because expectations for him were higher. Both David Cameron and Gordon Brown were much improved but neither made a breakthrough, which Cameron needed more than Brown. Unless there are more dramatic shifts, it seems Conservative prospects of an overall majority have gone.
In its final phases, this election campaign is likely to focus increasingly on the risks or relative merits of what the British still quaintly call “a hung parliament”. The Conservatives’ strategic response to the Liberal Democrat rise appears to have been to scaremonger about the consequences of an inconclusive electoral outcome. On Wednesday, the Tories rolled out former chancellor of the exchequer Ken Clarke to warn that instability could cause a lack of confidence in the markets about Britain’s capacity to address its financial problems, and could even require intervention from the International Monetary Fund. This was accompanied by a flood of dire warnings of political gridlock and economic instability.
The British drew primarily from US politics in designing their televised leaders’ debates. When it comes to designing mechanisms to cope with the consequences of a hung parliament, they should look closer to home.
In Ireland we have long since gotten over our hang-up about hung parliaments. All but three elections since 1932 elected a Dáil where no party had an overall majority. It is almost a quarter of a century since we elected a one-party government. The Irish political system and voters are comfortable with the idea of either single party minority governments or coalitions. The leaders and members of our political parties have had to adapt to political realities, and the final coalition Rubicon was crossed in 1989 when Fianna Fáil wisely abandoned its “core principle” of non-participation in coalitions.
Some of our coalition governments came to acrimonious ends, but such acrimony has on balance been no greater than that at times experienced within some of the larger parties.
The British political system will similarly come to adjust. The mechanics of putting together a governing coalition are a little more complex because of the workings of Britain’s unwritten constitution. The British public are used to seeing their prime minister visit Queen Elizabeth on the morning after polling and being installed or reinstalled in Downing Street before lunch.
The prospect of waiting a few weeks while the Liberal Democrats negotiate a programme for government with Labour or the Conservatives may be unnerving for some, but they too will have to adapt. There is every prospect that post-election horse-trading could quickly deliver an agreed platform for a new British government which, with a comfortable majority, could run a full term.
Tackling their country’s budgetary problems will be the first task for whichever configuration of parties comes to power in Britain. Reforming their country’s electoral system should also be an early priority.