Frank Millar, London Editor, looks at the possible political permutations arising out of Wednesday's Northern Ireland Assembly elections and asks 'is there a way out?'
What is Wednesday's election in Northern Ireland for? Having cut David Trimble adrift with their decision to hold it, might Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern have a similar fate in mind for a threatened anti-Belfast Agreement unionist majority?
Is it credible for them to insist there can be no renegotiation of the agreement, even if a unionist majority demands it? If so, will they change the Assembly's cross-community voting rules to empower a simple "pro-agreement majority" - so reducing unionism to permanent minority status in the devolved administration? Or might Jeffrey Donaldson do a post-election deal with David Trimble that guarantees him the unionist succession and saves the agreement?
The election is to a still-suspended Assembly whose putative members don't know if they will be paid their salaries. Obviously, London and Dublin are hoping it will be all right on the day and that Mr Trimble survives with enough votes to conclude his negotiation with Gerry Adams and quickly reinstate a power-sharing Executive.
However, the lack of clarity from London on the money issue suggests a more realistic assessment - one consistent with the Taoiseach's fear that the result will be "a mess".
The extent of the mess may not become clear until the transfers have been exhausted and the final seats won and lost. However, if the end result is the "worst-case scenario" feared by both governments, and the Democratic Unionist Party emerges the majority unionist party, what then?
The two governments would obviously forge ahead with the scheduled review of the agreement. And, on the basis that "one man's review might prove another's renegotiation", would seek to establish just how serious the DUP is about an alternative settlement or whether, with a bit of tinkering around the edges, the lure of office might persuade Dr Paisley's "modernisers" to accommodate themselves to the essential framework of the Good Friday accord.
This would chime with the Trimbleista charge that Mr Robinson is fighting a "DUP-lite" campaign. However, it may be to seriously underestimate the DUP deputy leader.
Mr Robinson is a tough operator, with plenty of street craft, who feels he need take no lectures in negotiation from a UUP leadership which, by its own admission, has had its "eye wiped" at least three times by republicans.
Whatever the cynical calculations of governing elites and chattering classes, it is hard to believe Mr Robinson would be content to emerge victorious from an election only to confirm that there is little more to him than a desire to replace Mr Trimble in the top job. And it is even harder to imagine that Dr Paisley - who just happens still to be the leader of the DUP - intends that to be the end result of what he hopes will be his greatest electoral triumph.
Anticipating that triumph in the Commons a few weeks back, Strangford MP Iris Robinson asked Secretary of State Paul Murphy for an assurance that the British government would respect the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland as registered at the ballot box. Mr Murphy replied that "of course" they would.
However, when asked about this a few days later, one senior Whitehall source told The Irish Times: "Well, it depends what you mean by 'the people of Northern Ireland'. The people of Northern Ireland means more than just the majority of unionists."
Which begs the question: what happens if the unionists elect an anti-agreement majority but the pro-agreement parties overall - including a unionist rump - still have a majority of seats in the Assembly? The agreement, with its cross-community voting rules and various checks and balances, represented the triumph of John Hume's insistence that "majoritarianism" does not work in a divided society.
But might that fine principle be set aside in favour of a simple pro-agreement majority in circumstances where Dr Paisley and Mr Robinson presume to call the shots?
This is pertinent for two reasons. First, it has been tried before. The notorious redesignation of Alliance and Women's Coalition members as "unionist", for the purpose of re-electing Mr Trimble as First Minister after he resigned, violated the cross-community consent principle and denied the people the election that should have followed the exhaustion of Mr Trimble's mandate.
Also, partly as a result of that highly doubtful manoeuvre, the British/Irish Joint Declaration has already identified the question of voting procedures as one for the upcoming review.
Surprisingly, the DUP has not demanded an assurance from all unionist candidates that they would not agree any lowering of the cross-community threshold - for example, in favour of simple weighted-majorities. This may of course reflect the current conventional wisdom that the position of a minority unionist bloc in such circumstances would be untenable. Yet if that is so, it still leaves us with the question: what happens if a successful DUP remains intent on a wholesale renegotiation, while the pros insist the Belfast Agreement remains "the only show in town"?
One recurring suggestion in some Sinn Féin circles is that it would then be for London to face down the unionist "rejectionists" by agreeing an enhanced role for Dublin in the government of Northern Ireland. However, this would not be as easy or attractive for Mr Blair as republicans might think.
True, the prime minister still has a massive majority and is still on course to win a third term. That said, his position is not as strong as it was when first taking office six-and-a-half years ago. A newly invigorated Conservative Opposition led by Michael Howard - with the support of the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph at least - could threaten potential "domestic" consequences for any drive toward greater London/Dublin authority.
Moreover, the lessons of nearly 30 years of Direct Rule will incline the British to test the DUP's willingness and ability to negotiate to the point of destruction. And while they might be prepared to gamble on Direct Rule with added Dublin influence, Sinn Féin's patent need and desire for ministerial office suggests that Mr Adams will sit down with whatever leadership unionism elects, albeit while regarding a fresh negotiation as the starting point for a further republican advance.
It need hardly be said that such a negotiation would be difficult and protracted. It is possible it might require yet another election. There is also the likelihood that any resultant agreement would require further referendums, North and South.
The DUP might wish to ignore the fact but it remains nonetheless that the Belfast Agreement is an international treaty backed also by the votes of the people of the Republic, not to mention the constitutional changes made on foot of the 1998 settlement.
Finally, we must allow that it may never come to this. The Ulster Unionists might confound the predictions and win an overall majority of unionist seats. The polls show a majority of unionists still supporting the agreement provided there are paramilitary "acts of completion". Unless its core support evaporates, proportional representation should work to UUP advantage. And Mr Trimble has always said he would cling to the leadership while he had a majority of just one.
Yet if he has it come Friday, it will be courtesy of the events that prevented him from expelling Jeffrey Donaldson and fellow MPs Martin Smyth and David Burnside from the party. Barring an unimaginable collapse in the Paisley vote - liberating Mr Trimble even from his internal dissidents - it will be Mr Donaldson, then, who has an armlock on the entire process.
The current assumption is that in that situation - or one where both parties had an equal number of seats - Mr Donaldson would try to finish Mr Trimble offwhile coalescing with the DUP in demanding a renegotiation.
But would he? This would certainly be the instinct of the former party leader, Lord Molyneaux. Yet for all his perceived closeness to the noble Lord, it is Mr Burnside - not Mr Donaldson - who looks and sounds the more convincing leader of the "No" camp. Mr Donaldson is in fact a "soft No" who does not really believe a fundamentally different agreement can be had. His claim rather is that he would make a better job than Mr Trimble of putting democratic manners on the IRA.
Which of course presupposes a negotiation with Sinn Féin. Like it or not, the electorate could oblige Mr Donaldson to partner Mr Trimble in that negotiation, albeit while handing him the effective power of decision.
While unquestionably painful for Trimble loyalists, Mr Trimble might think to concentrate Mr Donaldson's mind further with the first choice of unionist ministries from which to secure his claim to an eventual, and possibly early, succession.
If the DUP wins, Peter Robinson's long promise will finally be put to the test. If not, Mr Trimble will almost certainly try once more to save the Agreement by making Mr Donaldson an offer he could find difficult to refuse.