Yesterday's statement from the Group of Eight industrialised countries on the basic elements of a Kosovo settlement, is a considerable diplomatic achievement, a necessary but not sufficient, basis for reaching an agreement. By including Russia and endorsing United Nations approval, it has moved substantially towards a more acceptable and inclusive approach. But the document has several weaknesses which require urgent attention before a ceasefire can be declared in NATO's bombing campaign in return for withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo and the creation of conditions for a safe return of the refugees.
The statement reflects well on the persistent efforts of the German government. The main elements include an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo; the withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces; the deployment of an effective international civil and security presence; the safe return of refugees and unimpeded access to international aid; a political process endorsed by the UN; and a comprehensive development programme.
Crucially, disagreement revolves around the role of NATO troops in an international force to oversee and implement an agreement and how they would be commanded. These troops are ruled out by the Milosevic regime in Serbia, still resisted by Moscow, but insisted upon by NATO leaders - and, very significantly, by Kosovo leaders including Mr Ibrahim Rugovo in Rome yesterday. It looks as if the Russians will, in due course, accept a role for NATO troops, subject to a Security Council resolution defining it and providing for a shared command - if that is, President Yeltsin can impose discipline on his negotiators. Intelligently, yesterday's statement provides for consultation with China. If the Russians agree on a UN resolution, the Chinese are more likely to drop their veto, allowing for a solution to be imposed on Serbia. The pity is that it took so much death and destruction to reach the position brought potentially within reach yesterday.
Whether similar progress can be made towards a political settlement is more problematic. Yesterday's statement skirts around the basic principles involved and disregards the catastrophic events since the NATO bombing began. The ethnic cleansing and mass expulsions have enormously strengthened the case for independence among the refugees, as is reflected in recruitment to the Kosovo Liberation Army. Decommissioning its arms, as called for in the statement, thus looks highly unrealistic. So does autonomy, as per the Rambouillet accords, unless it can be expressed in a formula guaranteed by the UN itself and not subject to unilateral Serb withdrawal of support.
These are grave shortcomings. But they are amenable to negotiation and diplomacy, with a view to assembling a deal capable of Security Council approval. Progress towards that end will be facilitated by a pause in NATO's bombing campaign, which cannot continue for much longer without a credible commitment to the use of ground troops. Since political caution and popular uncertainty seem to rule that out, intensified diplomacy offers the better way of securing a just settlement.