President Clinton, in his eight years in the White House, has failed to sign an important arms deal with Russia. He has been involved instead, to his political embarrassment, in ensuring the enforcement of pacts negotiated by Republican presidents. In Moscow this weekend, his initial task is to move in a totally different direction.
An attempt to persuade President Putin to accept the construction of an American missile shield against nuclear attack by what are termed "rogue states" would have required the dismantling rather than the enforcing of a nuclear weapons treaty. Russia's opposition to this was so resolute that his chances of success were zero. It is now suggested that a joint missile defence system be installed; something Republicans in the US are likely to oppose strenuously. Moscow regards the American plan, known as NMD (national missile defence system) as clearly in breach of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) which it considers a bulwark against nuclear expansion. The official position of the US has been that ABM is outdated and NMD will become necessary as smaller states with nuclear weapons develop the long-range missiles to deliver them.
Mr Putin, though young in years for a political leader, is a former KGB operative. His Cold-War experience makes him, therefore, an old hand in analysing the West's options and identifying its strong and weak points.
As a "lame duck" president, Moscow will assess Mr Clinton as a person who may lack the purpose and energy to follow through with his proposals. The Kremlin will also have noted that NMD does not have the full support of the foreign policy establishment in the United States. It will have noted too that NMD has been far from welcome among America's NATO allies in Western Europe.
At the current stage of development of their missile technology, countries such as Iran, Iraq and Libya, pose a far greater threat to Europe which will come within range far earlier than the United States. As far as North Korea is concerned, Japan, for the predictable future, seems to be the only viable target.
In the Cold-War days, Moscow usually faced a Western alliance that was firmly united in purpose. Today it sees no consensus in the US on NMD and outright opposition on the part of some of Washington's European allies.
Mr Putin, in pursuing Russia's national interest has, for once, an advantage over the West. He can also use this for his own domestic purposes and portray himself as a strong leader, capable of blocking Western nuclear expansion. This will involve the portrayal of a Russia that has regained international respect. Renewed national pride, on its part, may help Russians accept increasingly authoritarian domestic policies. From the American side, there will be a strong temptation for President Clinton to leave the matter of NMD to his successor. To go ahead with the NMD project without Russian agreement, as some Republicans have suggested, could damage relations between Washington and Moscow to the extent of constructing a new Iron Curtain. The Russian aptitude for chess is proverbial. On the nuclear board at present, Mr Putin's pieces are extremely favourably placed. His suggestion that a joint shield be constructed could mark the beginning of the endgame.