Struggling in opinion polls and with an election less than two years away, Rishi Sunak’s decision to prioritise resolving problems over the Northern Ireland protocol wasn’t obvious to most voters in the UK. The repeated failure to resurrect Stormont might have been an issue on the island of Ireland but wasn’t top of anyone’s list in the key marginal constituencies in Britain now known as the Red or Blue Wall. The state of the National Health Service, a wave of strikes and, above all, a flatlining economy are all far bigger issues.
The link between the UK’s poor economic performance and Brexit barriers with the EU has become increasingly clear to UK voters, which can’t help the Conservative Party’s prospects. That may have, however, suggested kicking the protocol issue into the long grass, as plenty in his own party suggested. What they were missing, though, was the extent to which the row was preventing Sunak establishing his agenda as prime minister.
In particular, his predecessors, Boris Johnson and Liz Truss, had left him to own the UK’s threat to unilaterally break international law through the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill. International reaction had been consistent, the EU broke off most discussions, including on accession to its Horizon research programme, and threatened trade war. US anger was obvious and trade discussions were not prioritised. Members of the 11-country Trans Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), to which the UK wants to accede, made it clear this wouldn’t happen if the threat continued. Such precedent really mattered when China was another applicant.
The advantage that Sunak had was an EU that has always been willing to treat Northern Ireland differently, particularly if their core interests were taken seriously
Dating back to the Brexit vote in 2016, a deep belief the Conservative Party held was that the EU only responded to threats in negotiations. Untouched by the failure of this approach in withdrawal and trade negotiations, as well as the absence of evidence from other EU negotiations, it was a curse starting to actively damage UK interests. Why, asked so many potential investors, would we establish new facilities in a country whose trade relations were being undermined from within.
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Sunak thus really needed to resolve the Northern Ireland protocol row. Talk of trade wars had to be ended and action taken to respond to what businesses were saying, rather than treating them as an EU-loving enemy. Of course, many of his party and plenty of unionists seemed only to want outcomes that the EU would never agree to – basically, that they should trust the UK to protect the single market – but his gamble was that something substantive could be negotiated, which would seem to be almost as good.
Counter to the UK discussion, the advantage that Sunak had was an EU that has always been willing to treat Northern Ireland differently, particularly if their core interests were taken seriously. A different UK approach to negotiations, of respect, always had the possibility of opening up further concessions, as had previously happened with Theresa May.
Sunak could point to signs of EU positions changing, while the EU could in turn say their red lines were protected
The new Windsor agreement is incredibly complex in parts but, at its heart, it is two sides trying to find ways for Northern Ireland to be part of both the EU and UK. In that, the Belfast Agreement is rightly a precedent. Trade negotiators who have long relished the challenge of sophistry to disguise politically difficult commitments seem to have done a particularly good job. Sunak could point to signs of EU positions changing while the EU could, in turn, say their red lines were protected.
Whether devolved government is now restored depends on the Democratic Unionist Party and there may yet have to be a renewed political push to facilitate this. For sure, the new agreement provides hooks such as the Stormont brake, which could be helpful even if somewhat oversold by the UK government as a veto, when it is in reality part of a broader process. Within his own party, though, Sunak has done well. His lines accepted by sometimes rather gullible MPs and media.
Wider announcements, such as the dropping of the protocol Bill, European Court of Justice proceedings against the UK and the resumption of Horizon accession talks, will help. Timing has also been well choreographed with trade negotiations – CPTPP members meet in Vietnam this week – and there is now an expectation that they will say the UK has met the criteria for accession within days. A formal signing ceremony will come later. There remains the possibility of a President Biden visit to mark 25 years of the Belfast Agreement and the latest Senate Bill to propose a UK-US trade deal should meet less opposition than previously, even if not leading to immediate actions.
Generating more predictability about UK trade relations does not guarantee more investment and economic recovery but it should help. The prime minister will also have a certain political momentum heading into a budget and may start to recover in the opinion polls. Labour, which has supported the deal, is not yet guaranteed victory in 2024.
Meanwhile, quietly, a new political consensus is being formed in the UK with regard to EU relations. This accepts that the UK cannot, in fact, ignore its neighbours, that Global Britain has to start with Europe and that this is what more distant trading partners expect. Northern Ireland’s unique position further encourages greater regulatory alignment, a trend that seems likely to continue.
Sunak’s election prospects is a question for the longer term. That this was the driver for a new UK-EU agreement does, however, tell us a lot about the direction of travel in politics in London.
David Henig is director of the UK Trade Policy Project at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)