The first type of special forces commitment to the war in Afghanistan against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime consists of "deep insertion" teams of between six and eight troops. The purpose of these insertion teams is to conduct long range reconnaissance patrolling.
These troops patrol from pre-selected drop-off points to carefully prioritised target areas. At these locations they establish observation and listening posts (OPs and LPs). As these operations typically last more than 48 hours, the troops in Afghanistan are most likely operating the "Split OP" system. Four troops will man the "active OP" monitoring the target, while the remainder deploy to a "secondary OP"designed for rest and defence in depth.
This type of OP work is mentally and physically draining. There is a suggestion that British SAS teams have been operating in this role in Afghanistan for some weeks now. The troops will engage in what is known in military terms as the "hard routine". In other words, no hot food will be consumed in order to aid concealment and in order to reduce thermal signature.
In addition, all human waste will be bagged and carried out of the area of operations. This tactic is employed in order to deny the enemy vital intelligence about avenues of approach and OP location after extraction.
The purpose of these OPs is to monitor sensitive targets for capture or destruction. Among the targets monitored will be Taliban and al-Qaeda command and control points and vital military installations. With the assistance of local intelligence, some special forces teams will seek to establish "agent contact" in order to monitor high profile terrorist suspects for capture. This would be a high priority mission objective for the US and the production of "live" terrorist suspects will be high on the military and political agendas respectively.
In the event of detection or discovery, the OP teams will have a very detailed escape and evasion plan. Abandoning their OPs, the tactic employed will be to fire and manoeuvre to what is described as the "escape corridor". The only gear carried on escape would be personal weapons and "mission-essential equipment" such as maps, radios and codes.
On entering the "escape corridor", an electronically-monitored area, a preordained signal is given. This signal results in helicopter extraction supported by high-density air strikes. Incoming aircraft are directed on to the target area by electronic beacon and after dark, by infra-red night sticks.
The second special forces commitment, which will become apparent in the coming days consists of larger numbers of special forces troops involved in "Direct Action" or DA operations. These DA operations will have been made possible by the activities of the smaller special forces reconnaissance groups. In the coming days and weeks, these operations will consist of "search and destroy" or "capture" missions.
Using the night flying capabilities of units such as the 160th Special Operations Airborne Regiment, troops will be ferried to target areas on board MH 47 (modified Chinook) helicopters. Each MH 47 can carry up to 44 fully armed troops. These helicopters will be escorted by MH 60 "Crash Hawk" helicopter gunships. They will also be protected by "top cover" or fighter escorts of F14, F15, F16 and F18 jets. Once at the target, they will also be supported by aircraft such as the A10 Thunderbolt or the previously mentioned AC 130 gun-ship.
The key principles involved in these special forces operations will include surprise, speed and heavy firepower. On approaching the target area, the helicopter gunship escort will begin "reconnaissance by fire" directing a massive suppressing fire in a 360-degree arc. The helicopter formation, equipped with special "forward seeing" infra-red equipment will then hover over various drop-off points, discharging waves of assault troops. Never touching the ground, the helicopters will then move away from the objective and await the signal for rendezvous at the extraction point.
Once on the ground, special forces troops will immediately "advance to contact", closing with the target and engaging enemy troops in the initial firefight. This initial firefight is the crucial phase of the ground operation and special forces rely in this regard on the maximum exploitation of firepower. Armed with M16 high velocity assault weapons, M60 machine guns, and M203/M79 40mm grenade launchers, the ground troops will also be supported by "point destruction" air support from jets and "area neutralisation" support from helicopter gunships. Once the objective has been achieved, ground troops will manoeuvre off the target area and rendezvous with the helicopter formation for extraction.
These types of operation are notoriously hazardous and require a great deal of careful planning and high-grade intelligence in order to be successful. Despite air and firepower superiority, there is no guarantee for the US that these operations will be without American casualties. Despite this risk, it is likely that such operations will be mounted in the coming days and weeks in order to support the Northern Alliance advance on key objectives such as Kabul and Kandahar.
As I write, the US is attacking Afghanistan from the air on the Muslim Holy Day. This action, risking the outrage of Muslims world-wide, betrays a sense of urgency on the part of US and British forces in the region. These air attacks and special forces operations will likely be stepped up in order to secure the capture of key targets before the onset of winter.
In the wake of the World Trade Centre attacks and the declaration of war on "international terrorism" the US will be anxious to produce tangible results from its air war on Afghanistan. A winter of starvation and a dramatically accelerated infant mortality rate will be militarily, politically and morally unacceptable to the American public.
Tom Clonan is a former Army Captain. He lectures in the Political Economy of Communications in the Institute of Technology, Tallaght.