In his lengthy reserved judgment, Mr Justice McKechnie said the infection of hundreds of people with hepatitis C from infected blood products had severely traumatised the lives of many families.
He detailed the steps taken from 1997 to investigate the matter following publication of the Finlay tribunal report and complaints by members of the family of the late Brigid McCole and Positive Action. The judge said investigating gardaí had to examine the Finlay report, some 27 days of evidence and the appropriate areas of criminal law.
They had secured documents from the Finlay tribunal and from Positive Action, representing 750 people. A representative 73 were selected for interview, that figure later reduced by five.
Because of the complexity of the material, its sensitivity and the apprehensions of victims, statements were not completed until summer 1998, with one statement coming in October 1998.
There were then several meetings with GPs and hospital doctors who treated the women over several years. Some of these had understandable concerns about patient confidentiality and sought advice from the Medical Council.
Gardaí had sought statements from medical experts here and in Britain. The judge said he fully accepted that the gathering and assessment of this information was quite time-consuming. Inquiries also had to be made of the BTSB and it in turn had to consult lawyers.
The Garda file was ultimately sent to the DPP in October 1999, the judge said. He was satisfied the Garda response to this unfolding tragedy was "exemplary", was carried out with "the thoroughness required" and as speedily as possible. There was "no delay of any description" on the part of the Garda.
However, after the file was sent to the DPP in October 1999, there was a period of some 15-16 months of blameworthy prosecutorial delay for which no reasonable explanation had been offered, the judge found.
From October 1999 until Ms Cunningham was charged on July 23rd, 2003, there were lengthy periods of inaction for which no worthwhile explanation was given, even allowing for legal consultations, clarifications from gardaí and other matters.
While a different professional official in the DPP's office had taken over the file in 2001, this was not an adequate explanation for a delay of some seven to eight months that year when, the judge suspected, "little was done".
Allowing for the number of persons and technical matters involved and the medical input, there were no matters of substance which explained delays of some 15-16 months in the period from October 1999 to July 2003, he said.
Legal consultations and advices were sought but these related to relatively minor matters and should have been dealt with in a much shorter period of time. Most of the technical work was done by October 1999, he said.
The file was with the DPP's office for "an excessive period" of time and the explanations offered did not provide a legal justification for that, he said.
However, the judge went on, it did not automatically follow the court must stop the trial. He had to balance the right to a speedy trial and the stress and anxiety caused to Ms Cunningham by the delay with the public right to have a trial on a serious charge brought to finality.
In this case, along with his finding that Ms Cunningham had failed to establish any specific prejudice to her right to a fair trial, he had no doubt the public right prevailed.
Earlier, rejecting Ms Cunningham's claims that her right to a fair trial was prejudiced by proposed reliance on certain documents and expert statements, the judge said the issues raised as to the admissibility of evidence were a matter for the trial judge.
He noted that certain people who worked with the BTSB at the relevant times were available to give evidence and Ms Cunningham was entitled to cross-examine these. The nature of the evidence of those who had since died could not be known and he found Ms Cunningham was not prejudiced by their non-availability to give evidence.
He found none of the matters complained of by Ms Cunningham were sufficient to support her claim that her right to a fair trial was prejudiced.
He also noted that the DPP had argued that there was significant contemporary material available for trial.