THE PROSPECT that the British government would have to come to an accommodation with Ian Paisley loomed larger in 1979 than at any time since the start of the Troubles.
The leader of the DUP had been greatly strengthened by a strong performance in the first elections to the European Parliament, held on June 1st, topping the poll with 29.8 per cent of first preference votes. By contrast, the government believed that the Official Unionists were in “disarray”, with Jim Molyneaux eventually succeeding Harry West as leader on September 7th.
Paisley was regarded as a polarising figure, though it was felt that his personal ambition might make him more malleable to government attempts to find a settlement. In February, before the election, some officials detected that he was already seeking out a “more moderate vote”, by “floating ideas and arranging meetings to discuss them”.
On July 4th, Northern Ireland secretary of state Humphrey Atkins told the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, that Paisley “wanted to be prime minister of Northern Ireland” and “might be prepared to make some concessions in order to achieve his ambition”.
Thatcher “expressed some doubts about this”. She feared he would simply withdraw his support from any settlement if he was not placed at the top of it.
Before a meeting with the DUP leader in November, Thatcher was briefed that “Mr Paisley is perhaps the key figure.
By default of the Official Unionist Party, he promises to be the voice of the Protestant majority. His is not the sole authentic voice since many, perhaps a majority of Protestants, reject his fundamentalist bigotry. But he is an authentic voice and on many issues closest to the grassroots of Protestant opinion.
During recent meetings with the secretary of state, Paisley had been “at pains to appear eminently reasonable”. But it was also noted that he “will be reading the mood of the Protestant people very carefully” and might come out in opposition to the government at any point.
Sir Brian Cubbon, the permanent secretary at the Northern Ireland Office, summed up the predicament in July 1979: “There were indeed some signs that Mr Paisley already saw himself as a future Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. If he were to emerge further into clear dominance Ministers would be faced with a need to try to work with him instead of trying to freeze him out. This would be a momentous change, particularly if it was paralleled in the Republic by a counter-reaction to Paisley which brought Mr Haughey to power.”