ANALYSIS:THE INDEPENDENT review into the deaths of Cpl Fintan Heneghan, Ptes Mannix Armstrong and Thomas Walsh, who were killed by a landmine explosion on March 21st, 1989, runs to a total of 117 pages.
The comprehensive report, written by Frank Callanan SC, summarises its main conclusions in just over one page.
The main findings represent an unequivocal indictment of the military authorities in 1989 in terms of their duty of care towards the deceased.
Callanan distils the detail of the report into five specific areas covered by his terms of reference.
The first issue addressed is whether or not “the Standard Operational Procedures of the 64th Infantry Battalion were appropriate and adequate to ensure the safety of the members of the unit”.
Without recourse to legalese, Callanan simply states at page 103 of the report “No”.
On the second issue, as to whether or not the military authorities conducted a proper threat assessment, the report is equally blunt. “No. There was a failure to carry out an adequate threat assessment and to adopt appropriate force protection measures arising from that threat assessment.”
The report also finds that the three soldiers did not have adequate training to cope with the hazardous environment into which they had been deployed to collect stones – down a narrow lane close to the village of Bra’shit which had not been swept for mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Crucially, the report finds that the “device which killed the three soldiers should or could have been detected before it detonated”.
At the time of their deaths, the three Irish soldiers were sent by officers of the 64th Battalion to collect stones – according to the Irish military authorities – to build defensive stone structures known as gabions for perimeter protection.
This task ought to have been considered hazardous given that contemporaneous UN estimates for the area suggested that over half a million mines were dispersed throughout south Lebanon – with up to 5,000 anti-tank mines dispersed in “known and unknown locations” through the UN’s area of operations.
After years of conflict in the region, it was estimated that up to 40,000 unexploded artillery shells, mortar rounds and aerial bombs and rockets were also scattered throughout the area.
Basic common sense ought to have dictated that the area where Heneghan, Armstrong and Walsh were killed ought to have been swept and searched for IEDs.
Their deaths occurred just three years after Lieut Aongus Murphy was murdered by a landmine placed on the road between Haddathah and At Tiri by a radical Islamist, Jawad Kasfi.
Throughout 1988, other powerful and lethal improvised explosive devices were discovered in areas adjacent to routes and positions occupied by Irish troops.
Given this background and in the context of the overall risk posed by mines and IEDs, the report implies that the threat to Heneghan, Armstrong and Walsh would have been reasonably foreseeable and preventable.
In many respects, these tragic incidents were a premonition of the current nature of asymmetrical warfare – the roadside bomb now a global feature of the war on terror. Lieut Murphy along with Armstrong, Heneghan and Walsh shared the same fate that has since befallen thousands of US and British troops in the first decade of the 21st century – with 60 per cent of allied casualties lost to roadside bombs and IEDs.
Arising directly from our experiences with IEDs – both at home and abroad – the Irish Defence Forces are now considered world leaders in fighting the threat of roadside bombs.
