Trust in nuclear industry will not be easily restored

British Nuclear Fuels has for decades assured us of the safety of its nuclear fuel-reprocessing activities at Sellafield, less…

British Nuclear Fuels has for decades assured us of the safety of its nuclear fuel-reprocessing activities at Sellafield, less than 100 miles from our eastern seaboard. It is, therefore, particularly disquieting to know that employees within the company could systematically lie about output from the plant without the company knowing.

For three years staff who carried out checks on a manufactured fuel product falsified information and allowed material to go untested because the validation process was slow and boring.

It doesn't really matter that the checks were for the size of the fuel product, not its safety. The issue is that a company which for years has asked us to have faith in its ability to safely handle highly dangerous nuclear materials didn't have the management structures to prevent this fraud.

The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the British nuclear watchdog called in after the falsification was detected by BNFL staff, described the fiasco in its new report as "a systematic management failure". The 40-page NII report concludes: "The events which have been revealed in the course of the investigation could not have occurred had there been a proper safety culture within this plant."

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Even union officials at Sellafield, who tend to be pro-nuclear given the 20,000 jobs at the plant, acknowledged that the NII findings were "devastating". It is particularly ominous to hear Mr Jack Dromey, national officer of the Transport and General Workers' Union, say: "Old habits at Sellafield die hard."

What habits are these, and do they relate to the more fundamental issue of plant safety? One doubts whether this startling and important report will bring about any genuine change in attitudes at BNFL.

The company sacked five workers directly involved in the falsification, but as yet none of the managers responsible for them has been given the same treatment.

The company was quick to beg forgiveness, grovel and promise changes for the future. Yet BNFL seems more anxious to placate its Japanese customers than to reassure the general public, those who would suffer most if something went horribly wrong at Sellafield.

"We deeply regret these events and the problems that they have caused for our customers," said the company's chief executive, Mr John Taylor, and his fellow board member, Mr Chris Loughlin, who were in Japan to meet Kansai, a customer which had sent back a shipment of MOX fuel. "We now need to get on with implementing the action plan and restoring our credibility," they said. What about their credibility with the British public or us in Ireland who gain nothing from this nuclear waste facility on our doorstep?

The BNFL response detailed 22 "actions" to improve the situation at the plant. Included among them are "establishing a manufacturing ethos and attitude". This suggests that such a quality ethos has been lacking until now, so assurances by the company have been bankrupt.

BNFL also retreats to its old "safety" mantra, again apparently missing the point that the real issue is trust, not what it continually claims about safety and quality procedures.

"We have to remember that nobody is saying that Sellafield is unsafe," said Mr Brian Watson, head of the Sellafield site. We were also told that the MOX fuel product was being checked thoroughly and the company had "records" to prove that it was true. But it wasn't.

"It was also of some reassurance that despite the obvious defects in one stage, the report's authors were satisfied that our overall approach to quality control and quality assurance is appropriate," BNFL said in its formal response to the NII report.

It is of no reassurance to the public on this side of the Irish Sea, however. Mr Jim Fitzsimons, the Fianna Fail Leinster MEP and member of the Environment Committee of the European Parliament, said he would ask the Environment Commissioner, Ms Margot Wallstrom, to open a Commission investigation into BNFL.

This could be done under powers vested in the Euratom Treaty of 1957. Unfortunately all previous efforts by the Government to tackle BNFL via EU or wider European and international treaties have come to nothing.

Britain seems wedded to its nuclear infrastructure and will not move against BNFL in any substantial sense, so the company will likely continue to ply its trade and try to convince us that its systems are safe. Until the next time.