Wembley fiasco another own goal for UK's infrastructure

London Briefing: The headlines were as inevitable as the cost over-runs: "The Curse of Wembley Strikes Again".

The executive chairman and founder of Multiplex, the Australian firm building the new Wembley Stadium, has resigned, illustrating yet again Britain's pathological inability to cope with large infrastructure projects.

Cynics might also add that, whenever the public sector is involved, in any capacity, disaster will always strike.

The company insists that the new stadium will be ready for next year's FA Cup Final, but the omens are not good and doubts are growing. The FA will be well advised to buy an option for another year at the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff; the Welsh should see an opportunity - a distressed buyer - and strike an extremely hard bargain.

The new Wembley has been dogged by all sorts of problems, but it should also be recognised that the old stadium was hardly a model for the rest of the world and has bequeathed its own legacy.

If the modern argument for sports venues revolves around location - inner city or greenfield sites out in the sticks - nobody would come up with Wembley.

It is located in one of those London suburbs that are inaccessible, have limited parking and few pre or post-match places of entertainment.

The old stadium was a dilapidated pile and the previous owners were probably relieved to be rid of it and glad of the £120 million (€177 million) that the National Lottery stumped up to pay for it.

The overall budgeted cost of the new stadium is £757 million, but the final number is anybody's guess. Luckily for the FA, the risk on costs is being borne by Multiplex, which is already muttering about losses close to £20 million.

Given the incremental way in which cost over-runs always seem to emerge, many are willing to bet that the final figure will be much higher. Hence the departure of the chairman and the temporary suspension of Multiplex's shares on the Australian stock exchange.

One of the more obvious issues plaguing the company has been a series of problems with some concrete and steel contracts.

But there have also been much stranger problems, including reports in the Australian media of an extortionist threatening to shoot crane drivers on the Wembley site unless the company pays 50 million Australian dollars (€30 million).

The project was originally supposed to comprise a 100,000 seat multi-sport complex and form the heart of London's bid to stage the 2012 Olympics. Ken Bates, previous owner of Chelsea, got involved following the purchase of the old site, promptly ditched much of the non-soccer aspects of the plan, and started talking about hotels and other very non-sporting activities.

Many (possibly Welsh) commentators have been quick to point out that, while all these plans were being written and rewritten, the Welsh Rugby Union conceived, designed and built the Millennium Stadium - the finest venue in Britain by a mile - for the princely sum of £110 million.

Meanwhile, Ken Bates finally appointed Multiplex, which undertook to build the new Wembley for around six times the cost of the Millennium stadium.

The curse of Wembley is said to have cost two sports ministers their jobs and contributed to the one time chief executive of the FA, Adam Crozier, losing his. If everybody knows how to do Sven Göran Eriksson's job, they certainly know how to build a national stadium.

When Bates finally lost his job amidst a storm of criticism, he famously remarked: "Jesus Christ had only one Pontius Pilate, I had a team of them."

Perhaps the appointment of an Australian contractor was a subliminal recognition of the simple fact that Britain doesn't do big infrastructure; we are, it must be said, wholly incompetent.

I'm surprised that the French don't make more of this when they try to draw comparisons between the two countries.

Something like: "The UK might have full employment, but at least we have La Défense and our TGVs run on time."

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the lethal combination is the involvement of the public sector and the spending of large sums of money.

Maybe the (French) secret is to accept that these things always take three times as long and cost five times more than the budget.

Chris Johns is an investment strategist with Collins Stewart. All opinions are personal.