Irish policy on British security concerns might have had a lesson for Georgia's leader, writes Garret Fitzgerald
ALL SOVEREIGN states are, of course, equal, but realism suggests it is wise for a small state geographically situated beside a much larger one to ensure that its foreign policy does not pose any threat to that neighbour.
This concept has underlain Irish foreign policy, not merely since the foundation of our State, but, remarkably, from the period of our War of Independence. For, in the midst of that bitter struggle, the president of Dáil Éireann, Éamon de Valera, offered explicit assurances to Britain about the foreign policy of a future independent Irish State.
It is true that the manner in which he did this, in February 1920, in the midst of an 18-month tour of the US seeking support for the Irish cause, was maladroit, and split Irish-America down the middle. But however that may be, the thinking behind this move was deeply strategic.
What de Valera did was to write an article on this subject for a London paper, the Westminster Gazette, but a leaked version of it, unhappily for him, appeared a day earlier in the New York Globe. In this article he proposed that in conceding Irish independence Britain should do with Ireland what the United States had done when it recognised Cuban independence after the Spanish-American War of 1898: stipulating that Cuba "shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba".
De Valera supported this proposal with an unambiguous statement that "an independent Ireland would see its own independence in jeopardy the moment it saw the independence of Britain seriously threatened. Mutual self-interest would make the people of these two islands, if both [were] independent, the closest possible allies in a moment of real danger."
When independence was secured two years later, this commitment to the security of Britain became, and has since remained, a fundamental principle of Irish foreign policy.
The most striking example of this policy was enunciated by de Valera himself to Eduard Hempel, the German diplomatic representative, in August 1939. De Valera told Hempel bluntly that, while Ireland would remain neutral, he could not accept a demand by German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that our neutrality would be "unimpeachable".
He added that it was inevitable that the Irish Government "would show a certain consideration to Britain" throughout the war. In the event, behind a facade of neutrality, close co-operation between Irish intelligence services G2 and MI5 ensured Irish safeguarding of British security. Furthermore, Ireland collaborated secretly with Britain's war effort in no less than 14 different way - all described positively in a document presented to the British cabinet in February 1945.
The consistent pursuit by all Irish governments of the principle of ensuring that Britain's security would never be endangered by Ireland may be seen by some Irish people as impinging on our independence. However, in my view, de Valera was right in believing that the opposite was the case.
First of all, failure to pursue such a policy might, in certain circumstances (for example, during the second World War), have provoked a British reaction that could have seriously impacted upon our newly won independence.
But a second, and more long-lasting, benefit has been that we have been able to pursue externally both our ideals and interests, even where these conflict with those of Britain, without that country having reason to fear that its security might be threatened by our actions or to view such actions as being motivated by hostility.
Because of our known and enduring commitment to Britain's security, during the time when I was minister for foreign affairs and later taoiseach, I never had to worry about Britain's reaction to whatever relationships we might establish with other countries.
I always believed it was important that we take advantage of EU membership to reduce our economic and cultural dependence on Britain, both of which, understandably, had had some negative effects on our people's attitude to our neighbour; and while this occasionally irritated some British people, I never had to worry that it would be seen by their government as threatening.
Moreover, although from the late 1960s to the early 1990s our opposition to many aspects of Britain's Northern Ireland policy often provoked negative British reactions, these were ultimately contained by British recognition of our fundamental commitment to their state's security.
What has led me to reflect on these historical issues has been the recent crisis in Georgia. Just as Ireland was united with Britain in 1801, so also in that year was Georgia united with Russia, thus ending a dynasty that had been ruling for 1,000 years longer than any European monarchy - since 299 BC!
Although the Georgia-Russia union of 1801 followed a Georgian request in 1783 for Russian protection against Persia, the union itself was a Russian initiative, unwelcome to many Georgians - as was the parliamentary union between Ireland and Britain in 1801.
Our State had to grapple with minority issues, both in the North and to a lesser extent here, but because of its complex history, the Caucasus, including Georgia, has endless problems of this kind. Unhappily, Mikheil Saakashvili is no Éamon de Valera, and as a result of his imprudence Georgia now finds its territory effectively partitioned by its larger neighbour, admittedly in very different circumstances.
By allowing emotion rather than reason, nationalism rather than statecraft, to govern his actions, the Georgian leader has now unwittingly set back his country's cause - probably for many years in the future.