Statements made over the weekend and yesterday by Sinn Fein leaders Martin McGuinness and Mitchel McLaughlin of Sinn Fein, and in this newspaper yesterday by the Ulster Unionist leader, David Trimble, confirm the one thing we've always known about the impasse on decommissioning: that it will go down to the wire.
Sinn Fein's approach in recent days, however, has actually damaged its case and amounts to a political blunder, in my estimation. It has sought to present the decommissioning issue as one of surrender and conquest, which it is not. A decommissioning gesture would be nothing other than a sign of self-confidence and imagination on its part and would open the door to a most remarkable and historic advancement of its own interests.
Mr Trimble makes the point that Sinn Fein will not make any concessions until midnight plus five minutes, but what is true of Sinn Fein is also true of Mr Trimble. His optimism about an outcome is as much about putting further pressure on Sinn Fein as it is genuine.
The position remains very much as it was when the Taoiseach gave his now infamous interview to the Sunday Times. On that occasion he was accused of "confusing the issue", but while his use of words may have been clumsy, the position he sought to articulate - namely, that two propositions which appear to be mutually exclusive are actually both broadly accurate - is a complex one.
The fact that these propositions are articulated by Sinn Fein on the one hand and the Ulster Unionists on the other is neither here nor there. Both of them have substance. Sinn Fein rightly says that prior decommissioning of paramilitary weapons is not, having regard to the text of the Good Friday agreement, a precondition to that party's membership of a Northern Ireland executive. It says correctly that there is an obligation on Mr Trimble to work an agreement which he and his party signed.
At the same time, the UUP's "political reality" is that Sinn Fein participation requires a start to the decommissioning process, that there will be no membership of that party in the executive and that there will be no functioning North-South bodies without some movement from the IRA.
If "prisoners of war" are to be released under an amnesty following the cessation of military activities, then one is entitled to expect at least a confirmation that the war is indeed over. If the war is over, why the need to retain a stockpile of arms?
Sinn Fein counters by stating that it and all the parties to the agreement are obliged to assist the bringing about of decommissioning and that it is fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. This view is based on a view held solely by Sinn Fein that it and the rest of the republican movement are totally separate entities and should be treated as such.
For the rest of us, the commitment given to decommission by May 2000 was a commitment given by Sinn Fein on behalf of the whole republican movement and was entitled to be seen as such.
Martin McGuinness and others have a responsibility through the international body to persuade the IRA that decommissioning must take place in compliance with the wishes of the Irish people.
However, in recent interviews, the manner in which he has sought to present this issue runs the danger, in my view, of buttressing the perception in the republican movement that decommissioning amounts to surrender, thereby creating a Rubicon that McGuinness himself knows the IRA cannot cross.
Sinn Fein knows, as we all do, that decommissioning is not the only aspect of the agreement without a start date. There is no commencement date for human rights legislation, the commission on policing and, most importantly, the release of prisoners; but all are already under way.
As the Taoiseach correctly pointed out, the proposition that there must be progress on all aspects of the agreement, including the executive and the all-Ireland bodies, but not on decommissioning, is untenable.
The two parties to the impasse have not been without suggestions as to how to resolve it. The Deputy First Minister, Seamus Mallon, has been ready to point out to both sides the inherent dangers in their current position, yet Mr Mallon's noble efforts to find the middle ground seem to be met with increasingly firm rebuttals from both sides.
To the unionists he has pointed out that if the agreement is endangered then so, too, is the only realistic chance of decommissioning. Similarly, cross-Border bodies for Sinn Fein and nationalists also rely according to the terms of the agreement on the establishment of the executive and the Assembly.
Yet, notwithstanding this advice, Mr Trimble has suggested that the agreement can be parked or that it could proceed without Sinn Fein. Given the SDLP's position on the latter of these two issues, the proposition is a non-starter. Moreover, it further cements the suspicion in some nationalist quarters that that has been Mr Trimble's intention all along and that this is only the latest attempt to achieve it.
Similarly, there is a suspicion afoot that Sinn Fein would be quite happy to see the collapse of the Assembly and the executive, with the establishment of the cross-Border bodies proceeding. This, in my view, is also a non-runner. It is a fundamental premise of the agreement that the cross-Border bodies be accountable to parliaments both North and South. The point being lost, of course, is that Trimble and Adams, notwithstanding the current megaphone diplomacy, need each other. Both are too far down this particular road to turn back. They may not like each other, but stuck together they are. It would be a tragedy and a grotesque insult to the wishes of the Irish people for either side to plunge us all into the unknown, but that is fast becoming a possibility.
Those closely involved in the process have acknowledged that some slippage from the proposed effective date of March 10th is now possible, and even likely. The marching season is talked about as a real deadline, but there are others.
The referendum massively endorsed by the people of the Republic last May provides for an amendment to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution. However, that amendment did not come automatically into effect; rather, provision was made to allow the Government to give effect to the amendment once it declared it was obliged to do so under the terms of the British-Irish agreement.
The agreement, in turn, can only become binding on the State when there is legislative provision for the establishment, immediately on the entry into force of the agreement, of the North-South council, the implementation bodies, the British-Irish council and the British-Irish intergovernmental conference.
According to the new Article 29.7.5, if the relevant declaration is not made within 12 months of the section being added to the Constitution - which happened on June 3rd, 1998 - "or such longer period as may be provided for by law", the new section shall cease to have effect.
In other words, the Government loses the power to make a declaration that the replacement Articles 2 and 3 should come into force. Were that to happen, the Good Friday agreement would, of course, fall apart, since changes to the Constitution are intended as an integral and final step in the process of implementing that agreement.
The clear intention was that all matters necessary to ensure that new institutions are up and running would be settled within one year. Article 29.7.5 does allow for the 12-month deadline to be extended by the Oireachtas "for such longer period as may be provided for by law".
It appears from the text of the amendment that such legislation must be for a fixed and stated period. If, as the Taoiseach anticipates, it may be necessary to put the agreement on hold until the autumn, what sort of extension of time would he seek from the Oireachtas?
It would, to put it mildly, be clearly unsatisfactory, in the absence of agreement, that the parliament of this State should be setting out a binding time-frame within which parties represented at Stormont should resolve their present differences. Yet, if no agreement is arrived at by the first anniversary on June 3rd, it is up to Dail Eireann to re-set the stopwatch.
A failure to achieve agreement within that extra time would mean the end of this particular agreement and would send all parties back to the drawing board. The simple truth is that if one side wins this argument absolutely, then we will all lose.