No one was under any illusions about the Belfast Agreement. The core of the agreement was an offer of fully inclusive government in a reformed Northern Ireland in return for a complete end to all violence and an exclusive reliance on democratic methods. This was a generous offer and one which was enthusiastically endorsed by the great majority in Ireland, North and South.
The majority in Northern Ireland was willing to countenance a range of often painful compromises to secure a complete end to killings, bombings, threats and intimidation. This deal always included decommissioning. That is why the agreement commits all participants, with stark clarity, to the "total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations".
If the detail of when and how decommissioning would take place was omitted, this was in recognition of the difficulty of the task facing republican leaders. We were willing to be flexible in wording to allow time and space for them to deliver. What we did not expect was that the IRA would quickly disown the clear commitment made by Sinn Fein negotiators, undermining the essence of the agreement. Sinn Fein's attempt to water down its commitment to one of merely trying to persuade the IRA has been profoundly disappointing. While we understand the problems facing Mr Adams and Mr McGuinness, it is entirely unrealistic to brazen out the difficulty like a schoolboy with his fingers crossed behind his back.
In these frustrating circumstances, the Ulster Unionist Party has tried hard to be as constructive as possible. Because the Sinn Fein leadership said it needed to be in government to demonstrate the advantages of the agreement to its rank and file, we reluctantly agreed to set up the new Northern Ireland executive in December in advance of any start to decommissioning.
As Senator George Mitchell knows, this was done on the clear understanding, shared by all parties, including Sinn Fein, that devolution could only be sustained for a maximum of two months without a start to decommissioning. Although many Ulster Unionists found this, at very least, morally questionable, they nonetheless accepted David Trimble's advice in order to keep the agreement alive. Persuading a reluctant party was, however, only possible in the context of a post-dated resignation letter, to take effect if the republicans failed to deliver their part of the understanding.
The appointment of an IRA interlocutor to the de Chastelain Commission signalled an initial recognition of this understanding, but it sadly became clear that nothing of substance was achieved during December and January. Only three meetings were held with Gen de Chastelain. Decommissioning was not discussed in detail and the general was forced to report bleakly on January 31st that no progress had occurred.
Unionism took a serious political risk and jumped alone. With no reciprocation, and no honesty in recognising the understanding reached in the Mitchell Review, there was no option but to withdraw.
Mr Mandelson did exactly the right thing in these circumstances. By suspending the new institutions of government he saved them from potential destruction. Neither he nor Mr Blair had been able to detect anything of substance in the IRA "offer" which arrived 20 minutes after the suspension announcement; and Mr Blair's repeated calls for clarity have gone unanswered.
Those who have given credence to an offer which merely said that the IRA would "consider" decommissioning in a context of the removal of the causes of conflict are guilty of naivety at best. Sinn Fein's view remains that the chief cause of conflict is what it has always been - the British presence in Northern Ireland. Unless Sinn Fein is willing to tell us something different, the obvious conclusion must be that we will wait for ever.
While we read reports of all manner of constructive detail, the reality is that Mr Adams and Mr McGuinness were unable to provide any details of the IRA offer in direct meetings with unionist leaders this week. Neither has Gen de Chastelain been able to add anything to the oblique reference in his report.
The rapid retraction of even this vague offer by the IRA on Tuesday confirmed the suspicions of many that the IRA statement was little other than a spoiler, designed to confuse the media at the time of Mr Mandelson's announcement. But if the IRA is serious, it can repeat the offer and add the clarity which the British and Irish prime ministers have asked for.
Until this is done, Seamus Mallon's two questions - will they decommission and when? - remain. It is surely intolerable to lead the Irish Prime Minister to believe last week that a major breakthrough had been made on decommissioning only to withdraw it this week. The republican movement is either willing to decommission or it is not. It cannot fool about with such a serious issue and expect to retain any credibility.
I hope a clear offer will be made so that we resume devolved government quickly. For our part, we remain fully committed to inclusive government and to the Belfast Agreement. We will stick to our historic compromise but it must be on the basis of an end to all paramilitarism, including the holding of illegal arms.
Guns and government simply do not mix.
John Taylor MP is deputy leader of the Ulster Unionist Party.