ANALYSIS:IT IS three years since the tiny "independent states" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia first appeared on Russian maps of the world, writes DANIEL McLAUGHLIN
Since then, they may also have popped up in any atlases published by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Vanuatu, the only countries to recognise the sovereignty of either of these remote outposts in the Caucasus mountains, which for the rest of the planet remain part of Georgia.
In August 2008 they were the focus of a fierce five-day war between Russia and Georgia, which had been at odds since the 2003 Rose Revolution brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power with the intention of allying his country with the United States, the European Union and Nato, and of breaking Russia’s centuries-old hegemony over Georgia and the strategic Caucasus region.
Though the precise chronology and causation are still matters of dispute, it seems Russian troops poured into South Ossetia after Georgia launched an ill-advised bid to retake control of a region which, like Abkhazia, had been run by separatists since fighting in the early 1990s.
Moscow’s forces quickly rolled Georgian troops out of South Ossetia, flooded into Abkhazia and even pushed on towards Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, before finally settling back into garrisons in the two breakaway regions, where thousands of Russian soldiers are still stationed today.
The war was a triumph for Russia, and particularly for the often bellicose nationalism of prime minister Vladimir Putin and his longstanding efforts to undermine Georgia’s bid to join the western fold, and to shore up Russian domination of the strategic Caucasus region.
The conflict was a disaster for Saakashvili, who still claims to have only sent soldiers into South Ossetia to quell attacks on ethnic-Georgian villages by separatist militia, and to block Moscow’s troops as they entered South Ossetia through the mountain tunnel that links it to Russia.
The war showed Georgia, its neighbours and the world how far Russia would go to stamp its authority on republics of the former Soviet Union, which collapsed two decades ago in what Putin, a former KGB agent, called the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.
The conflict also reinforced doubts among western leaders about Saakashvili, whose impetuosity in reacting to Russian provocations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia jeopardised the very sovereignty of his country, which is the main US and EU ally in a volatile region that is wedged between Russia, Iran and Turkey and forms a key route for oil and gas exports from Central Asia.
Three years on, the heat of war has given way to an ice age in relations between Georgia and Russia.
The countries do not have official diplomatic relations and post-war talks between their representatives in Geneva have achieved little.
The EU mediator at those talks, Pierre Morel, recently described the situation between the neighbours as “stable but unpredictable, with a potential for dangerous escalation due to highly worrying developments and incidents”.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) this month called for direct talks to defuse a “fragile and potentially explosive” situation and urged the sides to engage on issues including regional security, trade and transport, possibly with Swiss mediation.
The ICG suggested that wide-ranging talks could be based on current dialogue, with Swiss intermediaries, over Russia’s 15-year bid to join the World Trade Organisation. All WTO members must approve Russia’s accession, and Georgia is threatening to block it.
That veto is one of Tbilisi’s strongest weapons against Russia, which for its part has imposed a damaging trade embargo on Georgia, banning imports of its excellent wines, mineral water and agricultural produce.
This year’s anniversary of the war brought no hint of a thaw in relations.
“Georgia accuses Russia not only of supporting a spy network on its territory but also of playing a role in the dozen bombings and attempted bombings that occurred across the country in 2010-2011,” the ICG said. “Russian officials have sporadically accused Georgia, in very general terms, of assisting Islamist insurgents operating in Russia’s North Caucasus.”
Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, last week called Saakashvili “a pathological case . . . an anomaly among all the Georgian people. He is moreover a person who was clearly badly brought up.”
Those comments came after Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called for his Georgian counterpart to face war crimes charges.
“Saakashvili does not seem to me a person who deserves respect,” Medvedev said, adding that only when he had been replaced could the two countries “have a chance to resume diplomatic relations and start negotiations on all issues”.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are now Kremlin fiefdoms, swarming with Russian soldiers, security agents, political “advisers” and businessmen; most people living there have been given Russian passports and will be allowed to vote in forthcoming Russian elections.
Three years after war, their hopes for real independence are as remote as ever, no matter what maps in Russia, Nicaragua or Nauru might say, and Moscow and Tbilisi are locked in a frozen conflict with no prospect of resolution.
Daniel McLaughlin reports on central and eastern Europe for The Irish Times