"And what good came of it, at last?" asked little Peterkin.
It is too early to answer Peterkin's question, although people are already doing so. Looking at the pictures of bomb and missile damage, it is too easy to forget the evil involved in that euphemistic term, "ethnic cleansing".
Up to May 31st, NATO aircraft had flown 30,000 sorties, of which 9,000 were bombing missions; all flights are considered sorties, including those for reconnaissance, support, repairs, servicing tests, etc.
What are the results? There has been exaggeration, denigration and spin-doctoring of the figures. NATO says the Serbs had 400 "main battle" tanks, 500 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and 500-600 artillery pieces (individual guns) and mortars in Kosovo at the beginning of the air campaign.
Two sets of figures are then given; 25 per cent of the tanks (100) and APCs (125) plus 150-180 artillery pieces/mortars are said to have been destroyed.
It is also claimed that NATO has struck 314 artillery pieces, 203 APCs and at least 120 tanks in Kosovo. It can be assumed that these are at least damaged.
It may be said that Kosovo is not an island. The Serbs can reinforce Kosovo from Serbia proper. But NATO has done some forward thinking. There are 14 rail and road routes from Serbia into Kosovo and it is claimed they are all destroyed. Bridges, in particular, are down.
At the beginning of the campaign, Serbia-Montenegro had about 1,000 fairly modern main battle tanks, plus another 140 old ones (many of the latter would be usable against open villages and lightly armed insurgents). The 257 APCs and 568 armoured infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) seem to be counted together.
There were also 1,226 towed artillery pieces, in calibre from 105mm up to 155mm, plus 83 self-propelled 122mm ones. There were well over 150 multiple rocket launchers of various calibres and nearly 3,000 mortars - all in Serbia-Montenegro before the air attacks started.
These figures are from the "Military Balance" by the reliable International Institute for Strategic Studies. Many of the weapons listed will have been hit in what NATO calls strategic attacks, i.e. attacks on Serbia proper.
The figures are formidable. But could the tanks and guns be moved into Kosovo to confront NATO? For this, some of the route damage would have to be repaired. That means exposing the workers to NATO air attack. Night routes could be improvised and used, especially by infantry. But cross-country night movement requires very well-trained troops. Anyone who has done night exercises for the first time will have recollections of the confusion and frustration that can occur; the white tapes that are missed, the difficulty of city-bred troops in real darkness, the navigation problems, the overriding requirement to be under cover by first light. And we have the shortest nights of the year ahead. One can hear the Serb generals advocating delay, by some means or other, until autumn.
But the fact remains, Serbia still has fighting capability. The Kosovo weapon losses are a small part of the whole. The overall infrastructure and economic damage must be more serious than Mr Milosevic admitted.
Surprisingly, Gen Jackson, the British NATO commander, went public about the deadline of the second week of October for getting the refugees into winter shelter.
He may also have been pointing out that decisions are needed now on the build-up of an invasion force and the future of the refugees. He would be well aware of the residual strength of Serbia's weaponry.
Gen Guthrie, the chief of the British Defence Staff, said this week that Serbia's oil-refining capability has been eliminated; 54 road and rail bridges have been damaged.
Attacks on Serb relay stations, etc., are said to have disrupted military/industrial command and control. On the whole, the air campaign seems to have worked in the end.
This has cost civilian lives and installations, although fewer than 1 per cent of 19,000 bombs have strayed, it is claimed. Are NATO, and the West generally, becoming hardened?