Sir, – Your editorial “The world set on a dangerous course”, published on March 2nd, touches upon the issue of nuclear arms and strategic stability, which is significant and calls for serious consideration. There are a number of points to look at in relation to the Start (strategic arms reduction) treaty.
To begin with this is an area where there is no room for “hints” or ambiguities. Contrary to The Irish Times view, the Russian Federation’s nuclear policy is defensive by nature. The principles of that policy are set forth in the President Putin’s executive order of June 2nd, 2020, which underlines that Russia considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, their use being an extreme and compelled measure, and takes all necessary efforts to reduce nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations, that could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones. The order lists conditions which specify the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the Russian Federation as follows:
a) arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
b) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
c) attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions;
d) aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.
Second, the issue of inspections. The New Start as any other arms control treaty presupposes a certain political environment, which makes an agreement viable. In this particular case the preamble of the New Start, which is an integral part of the treaty, sets out that parties are committed to the principle of indivisible security and forging relations “based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation”. That is clearly not the way to describe present circumstances, with the US and Nato waging a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. One has to add that Washington’s anti-Russia sanctions have impaired the efficiency of the verification procedures stipulated in the treaty. As a result, Russia’s ability to freely conduct verification inspections on a fully equal basis in US territory has been curtailed, creating obvious unilateral advantages for the United States. No one should expect Moscow to be willing to open its strategic forces for inspections in such an environment.
Third. The Irish Times reference to China, Iran and North Korea is totally irrelevant and has nothing to do with Russia’s stance on the Start treaty. In a very specific way it relates to the UK and France, which together possess 515 nuclear warheads. The integrated nuclear capability of the three nuclear powers within Nato, namely the United States, Great Britain, and France, takes on special importance in today’s situation. This capability can be turned against Russia. We have adopted a justified position in viewing the nuclear capabilities of the three Western nuclear powers as forming a single whole, taking this factor into consideration when dealing with processes related to nuclear arms limitation and reduction, as well as when exploring matters related to the New Start’s future.
Fourth. We cannot ignore the fact that the US has been violating the New Start for quite some time. Washington has been disregarding the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons sealed in the treaty. Moreover, the Pentagon has manipulated with numbers of warheads and delivery systems by renaming or declaring as converted over 100 units of strategic offensive arms in order to withdraw them from quantitative restrictions under the New Start without giving Russia an opportunity to verify this conversion.
Fifth. One has to look at the wider context as well. In order to redistribute the balance of power and achieve a strategic superiority with an ambition of global dominance Washington and its subservient Nato partners has deliberately dismantled bilateral arms control architecture by withdrawing from all major relevant agreements with Moscow. In 2001, the US quitted the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), in 2019 – the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), in 2020 – the “Open Skies” Treaty, to mention a few.
All that have been major factors in our decision to suspend the new Start treaty. This decision can be reversed if the US administration recognises its share of responsibility for the global strategic stability, reconsiders its reckless and dangerous policy on Ukraine and commits to the obligations under the New Start. This is not a matter of playing cards, taking stakes or any other sort of gambling mentality which seems to guide the analysis of The Irish Times on the matter. – Yours, etc,
YURIY FILATOV,
Ambassador
of Russia to Ireland,
Dublin 14.