Japan's continuing problems with its post-imperial legacy have been underlined this week by the failure to agree a written apology for its wartime crimes against China. In Tokyo, a court dismissed a claim from a group of British, US, Australian and New Zealand veterans in their long-running legal battle for compensation. The issue is important for Japan and its Asian neighbours, for on its resolution hangs the prospect of the country becoming an active political player in the rapidly changing Asian region.
The failure to agree a written statement during the first visit to Japan of a Chinese head of state, President Jiang Zemin, is a disappointment for both governments and something of a loss of face for the hosts. A Japanese government spokesman, explaining why it was not possible simply to repeat the written apology to South Korea last month when President Kim Dae-jung visited Japan, said "these are two different relationships. We colonised Korea but we never colonised China. In China it was a case of aggression, not colonisation". Such are the legal and historical niceties of this diplomatic game; on them hang deeper issues of compensation, aid and regional alliances.
In Ireland we are familiar with the psychological and political importance of apologies for aggression and colonisation. They are normally made only when such conflicts are on the point of being healed if not resolved. They are therefore an important index of normalising relationships, and should not be underestimated politically. In Asia there is still deep resentment over the slow progress made by Japan in these respects, reinforced by the apparently endless verbal gymnastics which seem intended to avoid culpability and responsibility for war crimes. But it must be recognised that Mr Keizo Obuchi's government has done much to make up the ground, first with South Korea, where his willingness to move has been more than matched by President Kim. It is to be hoped that the difficulties in agreeing a written statement with China will be rapidly overcome and not allowed to reinforce older prejudices.
Such an agreement would release commitments to political and economic co-operation badly needed at this juncture in Asian affairs. Over the last year, the fates of the Japanese and Chinese currencies have hung together, so far successfully, in that a relatively strong yen has bolstered the determination of the Chinese government not to devalue its currency. This has been an important factor in world economic stability as the effects of the Asian crisis were absorbed.
The Japanese government has also resisted pressure from China to say that its recently upgraded defence agreement with the US would not be directed against Taiwan. Some development programmes for China's more impoverished provinces also hang on a decisive improvement in relations, which can only be agreed when the war apology matter is settled. The Japanese will want to take a more critical approach to regional political and development policies when this is achieved. They are keen to combat the impression that in foreign policy and security matters, if not in economic ones, they are mere creatures of US policy.