I have been quite surprised at the limited attention paid by our media to the very significant reforms of the British constitutional system announced by prime minister Gordon Brown at Westminster last Tuesday - some at least of which seem to me to raise issues that could be relevant to our State, writes Garret FitzGerald.
It should be said that, quite separately from these reforms, it appears that the British cabinet is to be restored as a decision-making body. Over the years its role had been largely whittled away by several prime ministers who effectively arrogated to themselves presidential powers, transferring decision-making functions to cabinet committees, the membership of which they determined, in order to get the decisions they wanted to emerge.
By contrast we in Ireland have continued to operate the cabinet system that we inherited from the period of British rule. We have not, I believe, used cabinet committees to subvert cabinet government.
A number of Gordon Brown's initiatives would simply bring the British constitutional system more closely into line with ours.
Thus it is proposed for the first time to examine whether Britain should, like Ireland, have a written constitution, or a Bill of Rights. Some of Brown's proposed reforms would simply extend to Britain provisions that are already incorporated in our Constitution, eg the exclusive right of the Oireachtas to declare war (Article 28.3 of our Constitution), and to have a role in international treaties (Art. 29.5).
Moreover, through starting the process of reviewing the role of the attorney-general by withdrawing from that semi-political officer of state the power to decide for or against criminal prosecutions - thus making the director of public prosecutions independent - the British will be copying a feature of our system that was introduced more than 30 years ago.
But some of Brown's proposals will be new to both our states, and are likely to evoke echoes here when they come to be implemented. So we should at least be aware of what is coming down the British tracks in relation to these matters.
First of all, Britain's parliament is to be given a role in approving major public appointments, checking the suitability, method of appointment and priorities of such people as the governor of the Bank of England, the chief inspector of prisons, the local government ombudsman, civil service commissioner, commissioner for public appointments, and, more dubiously in my view, perhaps even "top" judges.
This will also be applied to the chairmanship of a new independent statistics board. Since Margaret Thatcher's time there has been concern about the independence of the British statistics system from political influence, a distortion that this proposal will eliminate.
There was a rumour 40 years ago that the taoiseach of the day had sought to delay the publication of a census of population volume for three weeks, in order to avoid having to revise the Dáil constituencies, and that a threat of resignation of the director of the office blocked this move. It is believed that this stance ensured no further attempt was ever made to influence politically the presentation of our statistics.
To make doubly sure of this, and also to secure adequate support for the CSO, on the proposal of my economic adviser Dr Patrick Honohan I established a National Statistics Board. I am glad that on this as on other issues the British are now moving in a similar direction.
Brown's proposal for parliamentary vetting of key public appointments could create pressure here for similar parliamentary vetting - perhaps even of the appointment of chairmen of State bodies.
Brown has also committed himself to the somewhat belated implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations of 1854 "to make a legal reality of the historic principle of appointment on merit, following fair and open competition", with a view to ensuring that the British civil service is not vulnerable to the whims of the government of the day. Some of Margaret Thatcher's appointments of permanent secretaries were felt to have politicised the British civil service in a way that has not happened here.
From the early days of the State our Civil Service appointment system was free from politicisation, and under a system that I introduced in 1984, recommendations for appointment to secretary-general and assistant secretary-general posts are made, after interview, by a top-level appointments committee of four secretaries-general and one person from the private sector. I believe that Ministers invariably make appointments on the basis of these.
Brown has also said that he will ban special advisers giving orders to civil servants, an objectionable feature of the Blair government, which I do not think has ever been allowed to happen here.
Another of his proposals, the implementation of which will certainly provoke debate here if it is implemented, is that elections be held on Sundays. Out of deference to the sabbatarian concerns of some Protestant denominations, not only the UK but also Ireland and, I think, the Netherlands have not hitherto followed the continental practice of Sunday elections. But if the UK decides to make such a change, our recent controversy about midweek elections suggests that there could be pressure for us to follow suit.
Another important British innovation is the proposal that in future ministers taking up lucrative jobs after leaving government will need to have such appointments vetted by an anti-sleaze watchdog. This already applies to senior civil servants in Britain, but I believe it has been suggested, on grounds that I do not understand, that it would be unconstitutional here to apply such a control for longer than two years after cessation of public office.
Brown is also going to give up the power to appoint members of the intelligence and security committee of parliament, which is to have its own secretariat and independent investigator, and the right to meet in public. This clearly reflects a recognition of public concern at the politicisation of British Intelligence prior to the Iraq War.
Two other British proposals would give a majority of MPs power to recall parliament, subject to the Speaker's approval, and would also give parliament a say in its own dissolution. I have to say that I don't understand the rationale of this latter proposal. Finally, powers that Gordon Brown does not propose to give up include initiating any inquiry into allegations of sleaze against a minister; and control over the system of awarding honours and peerages.