In responding to the Kosovo crisis, and in considering how best to restore peace and stability to the region, it is essential to look beyond the catastrophic condition of the Kosovan refugees and the evident miscalculations of NATO's bombing campaign. The truism that war dramatically changes circumstances has rarely been illustrated so vividly as on this occasion. If the region is not to disintegrate rapidly into uncontrollable conflict, drastic action to protect the refugees must be combined with a clear vision of the West's role - and that of Europe in particular - in providing a long-term solution to ethnic rivalry in the Balkans.
Contradictions abound as a result of the rapid pace of events. A bombing campaign intended to weaken Slobodan Milosevic has instead greatly strengthened him and marginalised those opposed to him. The Kosovan leadership is going through a radical revision of its attitude to the Rambouillet accords. The autonomy agreement which it was willing to accept on the basis that the Serbs would also sign up for it, now looks impossible of attainment. Independence has become a much more pressing demand - probably the only feasible option - following the mass clearing out of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo in scenes reminiscent of Nazi coercion during the second World War.
But how compatible is that with NATO's mandate? And would independence be based on a partition of Kosovo? This appears to be the emerging strategy of the Serb government; there is growing evidence that it also appeals to NATO planners and several of the Contact Group states increasingly anxious about the alliance's war aims. It could suit Slobodan Milosevic to take the northern part of the province, containing its ancient symbolic centres - and its rich mineral resources. This could allow in NATO troops, without confrontation, to protect what would have become a vast refugee camp. Such a policy would confirm the rough and ready cynicism about the Balkan conflicts that has been an abiding aspect of Western policy. One way or another, the possibility of committing ground troops to back up the NATO air strikes has become a striking feature in European public opinion over the ten days since the bombing campaign began. So have growing doubts about the wisdom of the bombing campaign, based as it is on assumptions that the allies' objectives could be achieved rapidly and by air power alone. There is a growing realisation too, that the interests and policies of Europe and the US may not coincide in developing short or long-term approaches to the Balkan crisis.
The case for the use of ground troops to prevent the expulsions, protect the homeless and the refugees and prevent a humanitarian catastrophe is very strong after these dreadful events. Backed up by air power suitably applied, they could be used to establish a protectorate which would both fulfil those functions and dare the Serbians to continue with their policy of ethnic cleansing. Simplistic dichotomies, such as a choice between support for the NATO bombing or for the Milosevic regime, must be resisted. Diplomacy has a crucial role to play, involving the Russians and the United Nations as well as the European Union and individual Contact Group states - notably the United States.
This is above all a European crisis. Only if policy is informed by an imaginative and generous commitment to include the Balkan region in Europe's political, economic, security and value systems, can there be any hope for peace and prosperity there. Without such peace and prosperity, it will not be possible to mitigate and channel competing separatisms and nationalisms. One can only hope the crisis can call forth such a perspective among European leaders. Without it, the prospect for continental order is bleak indeed.