Neither the Clinton administration nor Congress nor the public is willing to pay the costs and accept the risks of unilateral global leadership.
So writes the distinguished US international relations scholar and (conservative) practitioner, Samuel Huntingdon, in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. Although his article, entitled The Lonely Superpower, was written before NATO's bombing of Serbia began, it makes instructive reading in the light of the varying European responses to the war and the humanitarian catastrophe it was designed to prevent and has in fact exacerbated. More voices ask whether the policy is driven by the US in its own interests.
Will the Kosovo crisis precipitate a fundamental re-examination of European security and defence arrangements? And how does Ireland fit into this pattern?
Huntingdon mounts a scathing critique of US unilateralism, in which he talks of the "rogue superpower" and the "hollow hegemon". He reminds us of numerous real and perceived examples over the last few years, including promoting American corporate interests under the slogans of free trade; classifying certain countries as rogue states and excluding them from global institutions; forcing out one UN secretary general and dictating the appointment of his successor without paying up its UN dues; pressurising other countries to adopt US values and practices in human rights and democracy.
As background to NATO's actions against Serbia we should recall the trade war with Europe threatened by a dispute over bananas; the growing dispute over genetically-modified food; the ambivalent US attitude towards the emergence of the euro; and the fear that the St Malo British-French initiative on defence could decouple Europe from NATO.
It is all typical of a recent American syndrome which welcomes European integration but is apprehensive when it starts to happen. Huntingdon believes tensions like these are typical of transitions such as the one we are living through, between the bipolar system of international relations during the Cold War period and what he foresees as the multipolar 21st century. There was a moment, during the Gulf War when the US had a genuine unipolar role. That has now passed.
He describes current international politics as a strange hybrid - a "uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers". The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of major powers; but the superpower can veto action on key issues by combinations of other states.
It is an unstable system, in that the US would clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon, and frequently acts as if it were - but for which it has neither the will nor the capacity; the other major powers, such as the emerging EU, Russia, China, India, Iran or Brazil would prefer a multipolar system in which they could pursue their own interests and stratagems without being constrained by the US.
Europe is central to this transition. "Healthy co-operation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of American superpowerdom", Huntingdon writes. Hence it is not surprising that the Kosovo crisis is seen by so many as a crucible or laboratory in which their future relations are being worked out, between power and co-operative dynamics.
Critics on the left particularly see the US power/hegemonic instinct coming through plainly, not only in the use of military high technology and resources but pre-emptively in an effort to head off the development of an inclusive European security identity separate from NATO, sought typically by France.
Tariq Ali, for example, asserts that the prospect of bombing Serbia, as much as differences with Gerhard Schroder over economic policy, was behind Oskar Lafontaine's resignation from the German government (there is little independent confirmation).
Mainstream centre left and centre right opinion is less convinced and more willing to extend co-operation with the US. NATO works by consensus, after all, as was clear from the final decision to endorse the bombing, despite misgivings in Italy, Spain and France. A thoughtful speech by the Labour Party leader, Ruairi Quinn, to a European Movement seminar on the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace (PFP) this week addresses these issues from an Irish perspective.
Following the amalgamation with Democratic Left, the party is divided over joining PFP and, as Mr Quinn put it, many of its members are uncomfortable with the NATO bombing.
Mr Quinn raises the question "whether NATO is the appropriate body to organise security co-operation in Europe". Its pre-eminence arises from its historic role and political vacuums elsewhere, notably in the EU. Now that the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union no more and the EU so economically successful, should the EU "not begin to recast the whole landscape of security in the Northern Hemisphere? It is time now, at the beginning of a new century to think in terms of a new Northern Hemisphere Defence Union. Such a Union, recognised by a reformed United Nations and embracing the OSCE would contain three distinct but complimentary zones of defence capability - North America, the European Union and the rest of Europe and Russia".
Mr Quinn acknowledges that this would need a new EU intergovernmental conference and "it would almost certainly lead to a redefinition of our neutrality", leading to a referendum on the outcome. He evaluates PFP in this context, accepting that one must recognise existing reality on the ground, concluding that if PFP facilitates taking a step in the direction of a new European security architecture and does not prejudice received Irish foreign policy values "then we should be positive about it".
At the seminar there were many other interesting contributions, including one from the Taoiseach defending the Government's decision to seek PFP membership in the context of improved relations with Britain and the US. It would be astonishing if this were not so, given the involvement of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton in the peace process.
