WE SEE now that confusion is more effective than refutation, but good journalists are finding out what actually happened in Bosnia.
Military and political sense seemed absent from events and attitudes, but Security Council permanent membership was a factor. The UN, Charter is a 1945 document and due for television. Power has changed in the world. Britain, and to a lesser extent France, wishes to retain the privileges while fulfilling only - minimum responsibilities.
The shelling of Sarajevo, started in April 1992 and continued almost daily. The Serbs, always able to read Anglo French irresolution, kept the level "acceptable", about 100-150 shells and five to eight killings a day.
The British media gave many reasons why the guns could not be silenced. Professional military advice was said to claim that the guns, could not be hit. If such advice was given, one wonders how the advisers felt when the guns were so quickly silenced last September. Perhaps they had fallen for the old temptation of telling the politicians what the politicians wanted to hear.
The Americans simmered quietly, but retrained and reequipped the Croats and Bosnians using "military professional resources", a civilian firm staffed with retired military. They considered Bosnia a matter for the European permanent members.
The transatlantic tensions were barely concealed.
Finally, Gen Mladic went too far and was defeated. The subsequent Dayton Agreement is a strong document, with reiterated threats against non compliance. Its withdrawal timetable worked well, although the mine clearing requirements proved impracticable (or unenforceable?). Nothing has yet been done about detaining Gen Mladic or Dr Karadzic. Some ethnic cleansing has continued.
A "six month review" by the International Crisis Group, whose members include ex prime ministers Michel Rocard of France and Malcolm Fraser of Australia under the chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell (yes, the same!) have reported repeated and consistent violations . . . by all sides?.
A UN force would be severely criticised for such failures. Ifor, the Implementation Force, has more power and a stronger mandate than any UN force ever had. People in Bosnia can live without death in the streets.
There are pointers for the UN in the Dayton Agreement. Ifor's freedom to check any place at any time is a big improvement on the fixed verification intervals of the Kissinger negotiated/UN implemented agreements in the Middle East. Ifor's mandate to threaten and use force was probably necessitated by the long inaction against broken agreements and the ruthless shelling of people in unheated, waterless, unlighted towns.
Perhaps a lesson is that perceived readiness to apply force by the large countries might make the job of normal peacekeeping easier, and the use of force less necessary.
The real state of large country relations in Ifor is unknown, as it once was in Unprofor. But professional journalists are not baffled for long.
In the Mail on Sunday last September, Tim Sebastian referred to "the battle over information to the outside world". He then gave an account, astonishing for a Conservative newspaper, of news distortion by "the HQ of the British UN force". "Above all, the British wanted to avoid circumstances which would propel them into direct conflict with the Serbs . . . The reports were cleansed."
An extraordinary SAS failure to aircraft on an mission near "safe" area Bihac in November 1994 described. The Americans circled for hours. A "UN" statement said that "Nato" had, failed to indicate targets. The Americans reacted particularly when they deciphered a secret order Unprofor HQ telling the not to indicate the Sebastian also "pro Serb bias" and "support from within the Cc Party in London". It seemed far fetched until the recent news of Serbian contributions to the party.
Jon Swain, of the Sunday Times, has found that SAS men claimed they could not see Serbian tanks clearly visible 200 metres away in Srebrenica. "Six hours later air strikes were launched by Nato but it was too late". Next day the slaughter of Muslims began.
The media have made Srebrenica a simple case of a Dutch battalion in trouble and a UN headquarters in Zagreb under a French general and a Japanese civilian named Akashi (the only names mentioned). But the recommendations of GenRupert Smith, the UN commander in Bosnia, would have been decisive. We do know of adamant British opposition to the use of air power going back to 1992.
Articles in the Guardian last month by Ed Vulliamy show serious dissension between London and Washington about Unprofor. Again the British are accused of a proSerbian bias.
Pro Serbian attitudes based on history have never seemed an adequate explanation. National interests seem more likely. Britain wanted to retain permanent Security Council membership, so Bosnia could not be ignored indefinitely. But it could not afford the use of force and its consequences. Even Ifor is costing £300 million above the cost of keeping the troops at home, from a defence budget Britain is trying hard to reduce.
Adroit use of the media and attacks on the UN Secretary General made inactivity seem the fault of "the UN". "The British opposed almost every American initiative, even air drops of food, let alone air strikes", Vulliamy wrote.
"The strategy was so successful that when Ms [Madeleine] Albright [the US ambassador] queried the UN Secretary General over reluctance to authorise air power he replied: `My hands are tied. The commanders take their orders from London and Paris.'"
Vulliamy goes on to say that Britain's ambassador at the UN was the "author of the crucial clauses in the safe areas resolution which specified that Unprofor and Nato could only use force in response to attacks against UN soldiers, not against the safe areas themselves. This rule would lead to the denial of successive air strikes including that for strikes against the Serbs advancing on Srebrenica in 1995".
Terrible events happened when the big countries were in charge of the UN operation. Sardonic amusement might be possible if the survival of the UN was not so vital to the small countries.
Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali, an experienced diplomat, has shown admirable courage and consistency in the face abuse and misrepresentation. Attacks go with the job when a scapegoat is needed for the faults of the international system.
Our President has indicated that she is not a candidate for the UN post. If there is pressure on her to take it, is it possible to hope that the question of authority over the commanders of large country peacekeeping contingents could be settled, and more transparency in Security Council negotiations arranged?