How will Saddam Hussein defend Iraq from the military superiority of the US? Tim Judah in Baghdad reports
Yesterday at a roundabout some 15 minutes drive from Baghdad's city centre, a small group of men in uniform were digging a trench.
They puffed and sweated in the hot morning sun, but it was the least they could do for President Saddam Hussein, to whom they regularly pledge to give their blood and soul. Whether they will soon die in this trench or succeed in repelling an American-led invasion remains to be seen.
Working out exactly how the Iraqi military plans to defend Iraq is not an easy question to answer. Clearly, at such a sensitive moment, it is not something which Iraqi officials are talking about and besides, to inquire too deeply would perhaps not be wise for any foreign journalist.
Still, it is possible to imagine elements of various realistic scenarios.
The first is that following their experience in 1991, the Iraqis will certainly not try to meet the Americans head on and form front lines. Since the US and Britain will have total command of the skies, any such troops in static positions will simply be sitting ducks.
Indeed there is evidence that where a front line of sorts exists, in the north of the country, that it is actually being abandoned. The line demarcates the end of territory controlled by troops of Saddam Hussein from that held by Kurds in their autonomous region.
According to Kurdish sources in the north, several things are happening.
Firstly ordinary Iraqi soldiers are crossing the line to tell their Kurdish counterparts not to fire on them because they intend either to defect or to run away when the war starts. Secondly, many troops have been moved to lines further back to stop them defecting and thirdly, any heavy equipment has been moved to the big cities such as Baghdad and Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's home town.
Since 1991, when the Iraqi army hardly resisted the US-led attack which drove it from Kuwait and indeed elements of it spearheaded the rebellion against Saddam, resources are believed to have been poured into the elite Special Republican Guard, the Special Security Service and the Himaya, the president's bodyguards.
Unlike other elements of the military, a large part of these elite forces have been recruited on the basis of tribe and clan loyalty, which ultimately ties the fate of individuals to the president himself.
The big question then is to what extent they will fight? Saddam himself certainly believes that they will fight, (along with everyone else in the country) because every day they can be seen pledging their lives to him on television. It is safe to assume that no one tells him anything else.
If, however, when the first missiles fall, they hesitate, this could provoke a coup d'etat from within the current governing structures.
From what can be gleaned from foreign sources, the US plans an airborne assault to secure the northern oil fields and cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, plus a simultaneous infantry drive across the southern deserts. British paratroops may take Baghdad airport with the intention of securing it for US forces to follow.
Logically then, the best line of Iraqi defence would be to harry advancing forces and thus slow their advance on Baghdad, all the while preparing to suck them into urban warfare in the capital.
Whether the hundreds of small trenches and sandbag positions will be enough to stop any advance is debatable, but with Baath party members and other trustworthy people well armed, it is possible that Saddam's forces could put up considerable resistance in Baghdad if they stand and fight.
However, while Baghdad is big, with a population of some five million, any invading forces would have certain advantages.
For example, from the revolving restaurant at the top of Baghdad's television tower, it is possible to have a low-flying pilot's view of the city. It lies flat and is criss-crossed by major motorways, which lead directly in and out of the city and along which tanks and armoured columns could move quickly.
Certain buildings which might be symbolic targets also seem particularly vulnerable since, like Saddam's palace below the tower, it lies within its own grounds and could thus be hit with relatively little risk of civilian casualties.
If the invading forces do kill many civilians, however, they in turn can be used to Iraq's advantage to fight a media war to undermine the willpower of London and Washington to continue a war which was running into difficulties.
One unknown is whether Saddam will deploy his weapons of mass destruction against invading forces. He says he has none left but the US and Britain insist that he has, which is why he must be disarmed.
Before the US-led assault on Yugoslavia in March 1999, experts and indeed politicians and military leaders from both NATO and Yugoslavia almost all miscalculated.
Indeed, the western powers went to war because they were convinced that the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic would buckle after three days and he only risked a war because he also believed that the allies would call a truce after three days. In the end, the bombardment lasted 78 days.
Today, many believe that Saddam will flee or be toppled very quickly once an invasion and bombardment begins. However, as the example of Yugoslavia shows, no one can be sure of what will happen.
However, during the assault on Yugoslavia, NATO had no ground forces ready for an invasion. This is not the case in Iraq.
Likewise, a scandal late last year revealed a certain level of recent co- operation between the Yugoslav and Iraqi militaries and defence industries.
During the Kosovo campaign, the Yugoslav military deployed considerable cunning to hide its heavy weaponry. When the bombardment started key institutions, barracks and ministries had all been long since emptied. It is certain that Iraq will have taken careful note of all of this.