Ruling likely to speed up sex abuse trials

A Supreme Court decision today has cleared the way for the speedier prosecution of people charged with child sex abuse who claim…

A Supreme Court decision today has cleared the way for the speedier prosecution of people charged with child sex abuse who claim they should not be tried because of a delay in making a complaint.

As a result of the five judge court's unanimous decision, the DPP will no longer have to call evidence, particularly psychiatric evidence, to justify delays in making complaints of abuse.

Until now, the onus had been on the DPP, not the alleged abuser, to explain the reason for delays.

The consequent need for compilation of psychiatric reports had also led to lengthy hold-ups in many High Court judicial review applications brought by alleged abusers aimed at stopping their trial.

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In a judgment with implications for a large number of forthcoming and potential prosecutions, the Supreme Court ruled it is no longer necessary to establish the reasons for a delay between the alleged abuse and the bringing of charges against the accused.

It indicated that the accused would have to establish prejudice to their right to a fair trial before a court would restrain their prosecution.

Chief Justice, Mr Justice John Murray, giving the court's judgment, said the court was satisfied that, in general, there is no necessity to hold an inquiry into or to establish the reasons for delay in making a complaint of sexual abuse.

"The issue for a court is whether the delay has resulted in prejudice to an accused so as to give rise to a real or serious risk of an unfair trial. The court does not exclude wholly exceptional circumstances where it would be unfair or unjust to put an accused on trial," he said.

The court was giving its judgment on an appeal by a former teacher at a Dublin school who faces 50 charges of indecent assault on four young schoolboys who were then aged between 7 and 10 and were in his care in the 1960s.

The man went to the High Court to prevent his prosecution and claimed that there was a substantial risk of an unfair trial because of the lapse of time between the dates of the alleged offences and the date of his proposed trial.