Resumption of armed struggle has not been a success from the IRA's point of view

The road to the second IRA ceasefire appears to have been almost as tortuously fraught with problems as was the approach to the…

The road to the second IRA ceasefire appears to have been almost as tortuously fraught with problems as was the approach to the original 18-month "cessation" called in August, 1994. In the period before the first ceasefire the leadership element associated with the Sinn Fein leaders, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, won the internal argument within the Provisional republican movement about the use of armed violence. The debate was between those who favoured what was termed the "unarmed struggle" and those who favoured "armed struggle".

This argument had run within Sinn Fein and the IRA since the late 1980s after the "unarmed struggle" option was put forward by a number of party members during debates. It was generally accepted that the Sinn Fein leader, Mr Adams, favoured the unarmed option from as long ago as the mid-1980s, although he never publicly said so.

In 1991, a message outlining Mr Adams's position on the "unarmed struggle" was sent to the Government via an intermediary. However, it was a further three years before the internal debate within Sinn Fein and the IRA reached a stage where the IRA was prepared to actually call off military actions.

Nevertheless, a significant rejectionist element remained within both Sinn Fein and the IRA even when the first ceasefire was called in 1994. The man believed to be the IRA's long-serving "chief-of-staff", a purely military figure with no public persona who lives on a small council estate in Monaghan, is understood to have been strongly against a ceasefire.

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Another leading figure from south Armagh, who may have recently assumed the chief-of-staff role, was also said to be against a ceasefire. The leader of the IRA in Kerry, who is also a member of Sinn Fein, was reported to be similarly opposed. These men had a number of other important supporters, most of them based in the Republic.

Belfast and Derry republicans, who had borne the brunt of loyalist assassinations and attacks, were strongly behind Adams and McGuinness. However, one well known veteran republican from Belfast, a man who had served a long prison term in England for having explosives, was an outspoken opponent of the unarmed option. Other republicans were quietly critical of the AdamsMcGuinness leadership, although none spoke out publicly or at the internal conferences which were held to discuss republican strategy.

When it became evident in mid1995 that the British government was having great difficulty in accommodating Sinn Fein in direct political negotiations, the rejectionist argument within the republican movement began to regain momentum. The IRA's Army Council, having considered its options, decided in late 1995 that it would return to war. The decision by the seven-member group which controls the IRA was taken at about the time President Clinton was visiting Ireland.

The massive explosion at Canary Wharf in London, which marked the end of the ceasefire, did not come as a surprise to many within the republican movement, who had seen control slip away from the pro-Adams element.

However, the return to war has not been a success from the IRA's point of view. It immediately began to suffer severe setbacks from the security forces on both sides of the Border. Dozens of arrests were made within the first six months and tonnes of arms and explosives were discovered by police clearly acting on very good intelligence.

Attacks were repeatedly foiled or went badly wrong. The robbery of a cash delivery in Co Limerick resulted in the murder of DetGarda Jerry McCabe and the wounding of another garda.

The repeated arrest of IRA members caught in the act of preparing attacks has probably hit the organisation hardest. The sentencing of six IRA bombers in London to 35 years each last month was a particularly severe blow. The "issue of prisoners", as it is referred to, was included in the joint Hume-Adams document, issued yesterday.

Serving IRA prisoners lost any chance of early release. While the remand wings of the Maze Prison have been filling with republicans facing major jail terms, the loyalist wings have been quietly emptying as their leaders broadly adhered to their ceasefire. Republican finances were also severely depleted by the drying up of the very generous funds which had flowed from the United States to Sinn Fein during the ceasefire.

In recent months, the IRA has again had to resort to old methods of "fund-raising" in Belfast. According to republican sources, the IRA has recently been extorting money from businesses in west Belfast. It is reported that local business people have been ordered to hand over sums of up to £10,000. It is also understood that the IRA took over a privately owned drinking club, forcing its proprietor out of the business.

Popular support for Sinn Fein within the Catholic population of the North was predicated on a belief that a vote for the party would encourage a renewed ceasefire. In recognition of this, the IRA maintained a de facto ceasefire during the period of the Westminster, Dail and Northern Ireland local government elections. This cessation ended within days of the Dail election when the north Armagh IRA shot dead two RUC constables in Lurgan.

Despite acts such as the double murder in Lurgan, Garda sources have consistently suggested that the Adams-McGuinness element was again in the ascendant and that a ceasefire would come if conditions were met.

The fact that the IRA held back from reacting to the decision to allow Orangemen to walk down the Garvaghy Road in Portadown was an encouraging sign. During the Twelfth weekend, when there was a danger of street disturbances spreading throughout the North, the IRA ordered pubs and off-licences to close early to ensure that fewer drunken youths were on the streets. The Orange Order decision not to march through Catholic areas on the Twelfth was also an important factor in reducing sectarian tension and easing the way for the IRA to move towards a ceasefire.

The main obstacle in the way of the IRA calling a ceasefire was decommissioning. From a republican point of view, decommissioning was a condition set by unionists and accepted by the former British government simply to exclude Sinn Fein from talks.

While it was clear from late last year that there was again a desire within the republican movement for a renewed ceasefire, the decommissioning of weapons before or even during talks was a "condition too far" for the republicans. It would seem that the effective sidelining of this condition may have finally secured a second ceasefire.