This article is aimed at those who support Irish neutrality but who believe that the Amsterdam Treaty will in no way erode that neutrality. For those who aren't really bothered about neutrality and don't mind throwing our lot in with a militarised EU, the Amsterdam Treaty poses no problem at all. It will allow Ireland to do that. The fact that Ireland is immediately committed - if Amsterdam is adopted - to the "progressive framing of a common defence policy" with the assistance of a military grouping that supports nuclear defence policies (the Western European Union) has obviously caused no problems for either the previous Coalition Government that negotiated it, or the present Coalition Government that signed it. This is extraordinary.
The essential question about the Amsterdam Treaty and defence is this: do the Irish people want the EU to develop a military capacity with a nuclear defence grouping (the WEU), and for Ireland to no longer be a neutral country with an independent foreign and defence policy? This is the direction in which Amsterdam is moving the EU. For example, a common defence policy, even (arguably) a common defence, and the involvement of Irish soldiers with EU/WEU combat forces to "manage" crises anywhere in the world, are all provided for under Amsterdam. Rather than have endless debates about whether or not the magic line has been crossed when neutrality suddenly disappears, it would be more useful if the pro-Amsterdam side would acknowledge the direction in which we're marching. Instead, we're told "nothing has changed" or "We'll cross that bridge when we come to it", never acknowledging what's been lost on the way to the bridge or perhaps that we never wanted to go towards it in the first place.
The political reassurances on neutrality are hardly credible. Recently, the Government, Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left refused to give concrete form to these assurances when in the Dail they wouldn't support a Green Party amendment to the Amsterdam Referendum wording, stating: "This ratification shall not compromise this State's policy of military neutrality". The Danish Government added a Protocol to Amsterdam, stating that Denmark would not participate in any EU decisions/actions having defence implications. The Irish Government could have done something similar but didn't.
It is the J Articles of the Treaty (Title V) which contain the main provisions on the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The CFSP will now include "the progressive framing of a common defence policy" with the WEU, and this "might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide". The Council shall then recommend to the member states the adoption of such a decision "in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements".
There is strong legal opinion that, because neutrality is not enshrined in the Constitution, there is no "constitutional requirement["]
for the above decision on common defence to be put to the Irish people in a future referendum (There has been a "political" promise by the present, and previous, Government to hold a referendum - not at all the same thing). Whether Amsterdam licenses a common defence is vitally important. But the core question still remains: do we want a common defence at all? If not, why agree to participate in the process leading up to it?
More foreign policy decisions will be by qualified majority and will be binding, even on the minority who disagree. There is an "emergency brake" provision, allowing a member state to stop such a decision. But it's not in the nature of emergency brakes to be frequently pulled. There will be strong pressure to go along with the majority. Likewise, even though unanimity is required in the military and defence area, it's qualified by a "constructive abstention" provision, allowing some states to abstain while an EU sub-group proceeds with a military action. The abstainer accepts that the decision "commits the Union" and shall not take any action that will "conflict with" or "impede" the EU action. This form of flexibility will allow the EU to develop in the defence area more rapidly.
There has been very little debate about the WEU. However, this military grouping - inextricably linked to NATO, based on nuclear weapons, and with a binding mutual defence commitment - became an "integral part of the development of the EU" in the Maastricht Treaty. Now, in Amsterdam, it is seen as providing the EU with "access to an operational capability" and as supporting "the Union in framing the defence aspects" of the CFSP. The EU is "to foster closer institutional links with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide" and subject to member states' constitutional requirements. "Arrangements for enhanced co-operation" between the EU and WEU are to be drawn up within a year of Amsterdam's ratification. Anyone with any doubts as to how interlinked the EU is becoming with the WEU and NATO need only look at the Declaration attached to the Amsterdam Treaty (p.125-131) on the relationship between the three. It is astoundingly candid. Nowhere in the Amsterdam Treaty is "neutrality" even mentioned while references to the WEU and NATO abound. This interlinking will bolster both nuclear alliances and undermine not just our neutrality but the role that rightly belongs to the United Nations in the preservation of international peace and security.
But the most important immediate result of the WEU's involvement is the incorporation of its Petersberg Tasks into Amsterdam, including peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, but also "tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking". These latter tasks are in reality a blank cheque and could involve the EU - and Ireland - in a wide variety of foreign military adventures. Also, for the first time in our history, Irish troops could be "peacekeeping" for someone other than the United Nations and without a UN mandate.
There is much more in the military field, e.g. co-operation in armaments for the first time, included in Amsterdam. It is a great pity that the EU - which has always prided its accomplishments in bringing age-old enemies together via peaceful co-operation - has decided to embark on a military career. It is also ironic that the Irish people in the two referendums on May 22nd will be being asked to vote, on the one hand, to take the gun out of Irish politics, and on the other, to put it into the politics of the EU.