Michael Jansenanalyses the factions and whether Iraq first needs regime change in the States.
TODAY MARKS the fifth anniversary of a war the Bush administration believed would be brief and cheap. But the Iraq war has not yet been won, appears to be becoming a war without end and its costs could spiral beyond $3 trillion (€1.9 trillion).
In its September 2007 report to Congress, the Bush administration defined its "strategic goal" as "a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror".
But, its critics warn, the administration is jeopardising this very objective by consolidating its control in the face of what polls say are the 72 per cent of Iraqis who oppose the presence of foreign troops in their country. And Washington is tightening its grip on Iraq by negotiating a status of forces agreement to regularise long-term US military deployment; building a huge airbase at Balad, the largest such US facility in the world; and constructing a massive embassy in Baghdad.
Critical Iraqi and western analysts argue that there have to be major changes in US policy before Iraq can achieve security, stability, communal reconciliation and unity. Not least, they argue that until the occupation ends, Iraqis will resist - the US military, they insist, will have to withdraw.
For stability to be maintained, the US would have to hand over to what Middle East expert William Polk and former senator George McGovern call a "multinational stability force Iraqis could and would accept".
Iraqis would prefer such a force to be UN-led and consisting of troops from countries not associated with the occupation, such as Ireland, India and France. Troops from neighbouring countries would not be welcome.
While the UN remains unwilling and unable to accept a major military role, a non-aligned multinational force would be the only acceptable option. Iraqis would also like the US to shed its political role and allow the UN and other international agencies provide assistance and guidance.
There is no way, moreover, of avoiding the issue of regime change in Iraq.
US military analyst Anthony Cordesman and US commander in Iraq Gen David Petraeus both argue that stability will not be achieved without effective governance and development.
Petraeus, while not calling for his removal, is sharply critical of the government of prime minister Nuri al-Maliki for failing to achieve "sufficient progress" in national reconciliation, adopting essential legislation or providing basic services.
Reidar Visser of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs describes the Maliki coalition as an alliance between the "ethno-federalist" Kurdish bloc and the Shia Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), which are not interested in reconciliation and which seek to divide Iraq into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia regions. For Iraq to remain unified, Visser argues, governance must be assumed by "centrists" who want a strong government in Baghdad.
Yet, does that sort of potential coalition exist? A former postwar Iraqi official maintains that a two-to-one majority of Shias, his own and Iraq's largest community, does not want federalism or regionalism. This Shia majority consists of the followers of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, supporters of Maliki's Dawa party, the Fadhila party and dissident members of the SIIC. Anti-federalist Shias are joined in opposition by Sunnis, secularists, some Kurds, Turkomen, Christians and other minority communities.
He argues that if Iraqis were allowed a free vote on federalism, they would reject it, and that while most Iraqis do not dispute the Kurds' right to regional autonomy in the northern three provinces, they contest the degree and geographical extent of their self-rule.
In this scenario, if a majority of Iraqis were consulted, regime change could be effected by means of democratic elections.
Iraq's presidential council yesterday paved the way for elections at local and provincial levels which are due to be held by October 2008. The three-member presidency council said it had approved the provincial powers law which had been held up over objections by vice-president Adel Abdul-Mahdi, a leading figure in the SIIC.
Abdul-Mahdi had opposed a provision which gives Baghdad the authority to dismiss provincial governors.
The SIIC would stand to lose power in Sunni and Shia provinces in these elections and their attempt to scuttle them may have been cut across by Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who has called for reconciliation and free elections. Sistani still has a great deal of moral authority among Shias, and the SIIC, which has enjoyed his political backing since 2005, probably found it difficult to reject his appeal.
Analysts warn, however, that regime change will have to go deeper than replacing the current presidential council and cabinet and choosing a new parliament. They argue that the 2005 constitution will have to be altered to meet Sunni and secularist demands.
New opinion polls also show that Iraqis want to see the dissolution of ethnic and sectarian militias, the recruitment of Sunnis into security bodies, and the creation of mixed units in the army and police. Sunnis, secularists and some Shias want outright repeal of de-Baathification legislation so that mid-ranking former Baathists can take up public posts. Most Iraqis also favour the return of the internally displaced and refugees to their homes and the reversal of sectarian and ethnic cleansing in mixed urban neighbourhoods, towns and villages.
The SIIC, the Kurds and parties and personalities benefiting from Washington's postwar divide-and-rule policies would certainly resist such changes. Analysts argue, however, that unless they are made, Iraq is likely to remain a failed state and a restive US protectorate.
But for this to be avoided, the world will have to await regime change in Washington.