PROFESSOR Patrick Keatinge's foreign policy analyses are always mind opening. Practitioners - diplomatic and military - may look askance. But practitioners may be too close to their work scholars are trained to detect changes, identify trends and look for patterns.
"Change and adaptation to change" in the security environment are his themes. On the "confused" response to the Foreign Affairs White Paper he says ... "Where the country's contribution has hitherto been most clearly defined and where new thinking is most urgent... adaptation has taken second place" (to preoccupation with nuclear alliances). So the Irish debate on peacekeeping changes, like the separation of UN legitimation from the control of operations and on questions of capacity, co operation and contributor viability "has remained at a primitive stage". A little harsh on the debaters? Foreign Affairs has certainly provided information and encouraged discussion.
Keatinge shows that Ireland could become marginalised under UN mandates for peacekeeping by regional organisations. He says that the future reputation of individual countries is likely to hang on their professional performance rather than on general Cold War stereotyping and neutrality; and very gently sprinkles a little cool water on self congratulation.
Mandated peacekeeping may work in Europe. But what, one wonders, about African and South American regional organisations? Troop contributing countries in Bosnia now pay their own costs; the implications for smaller countries are obvious.
Keatinge says that neither the UN nor the Organisation for Security and Co Operation in Europe (OSCE) can provide the collective security embodied in the UN Charter. "Their relevance lies in providing political authority for international crisis management rather than in military protection "to their members." On NATO's persistence; "it is unrealistic to expect countries which value alliances to regard the UN and the OSCE as viable replacements".
He examines the security position of other European states, especially the smaller ones. "Security should not be restricted to the classic threat of military intervention by another state." Global or continental free markets will have winners and losers. Economic penetration, transnational ecological damage and cultural identity concerns are also risks. The White Paper adds others, including organised crime and drugs trafficking. Commentators elsewhere see political and police corruption as security threats to society.
KEATINGE carefully explains prevention, protection and crisis mangement (including peace keeping and peace enforcement). An understanding of these concepts is a necessity of our times. Military protection is but one component of security. He mentions the cost of crisis management in Northern Ireland; the paralysed unwillingness of the British and Northern Ireland governments to institute preventive reforms in the 1960s has salutory lessons.
On Bosnia he says that "the UN has, not for the first time, served as a convenient scapegoat". Continuing revelations confirm this. He deals gently, but conclusively, with the "instinctive distrust" of NATO in this country.
Our present Western European Union (WEU) observer status, without participation in military exercises, planning or missions, will have costs. It shows poor European solidarity. Keatinge's examination of the WEU options is thorough, complementing that in the White Paper. He accepts that full WEU status is politically impractical at present. If WEU crisis management operations became open to all EU member states, including WEU observers on a voluntary basis, we could participate. Something like this has been proposed by Sweden and Finland.
This is another valuable Institute of European Affairs publication. It is "of its time". Change continues. The UN has revived before America has cooled off peacekeeping before our electorate has surprised politicians before. We shall see.