Catherine Nevin bid to appeal murder conviction dismissed

Mr Justice Adrian Hardiman says application had ‘absolutely no points of any merit’

A bid by Catherine Nevin to take an appeal against her conviction for murdering her husband to the Supreme Court has been dismissed on the basis that it contains "absolutely no points of any merit whatsoever".

Nevin was jailed for life in 2000 having been convicted of murdering her husband Tom Nevin at their pub, Jack White's Inn, near Brittas Bay, Co Wicklow, on March 19th, 1996. She also received a concurrent seven year sentence for soliciting three men - William McClean, Gerry Heapes and John Jones - to kill her husband in 1989 and 1990.

The 61-year-old, who has always denied any involvement in the murder, lost an appeal against her conviction in 2003. In 2010, she also lost an application to have her conviction declared a miscarriage of justice.

At the close of the 2010 application, the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled Garda documents known as “Suspect Antecedent History” forms relating to Mr Heapes and Mr Jones would be disclosed to Nevin’s legal team. This material was not available to the defence at her trial.

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The court heard a suspect history form relating to Mr McClean was only brought to the attention of the defence by a newspaper article, published eight years after Nevin was jailed.

The document lists Mr McClean’s associates as members of illegal and paramilitary organisations, including the INLA and Provisional IRA. Mr McClean denied during the trial he had any links to paramilitary organisations.

Returning judgement today, presiding judge Mr Justice Adrian Hardiman said the court made the point "in the strongest possible terms" that there was "absolutely no points of any merit whatsoever" in the application.

Mr Justice Hardiman said the fact that the documents were disclosed by a leak, and by implication this meant the defence were entitled to have them at trial or at a later stage, was a fundamental and “pretty radical” misconception at the heart of the present application.

He said the court could see nothing whatsoever in the present application and it would be dismissed.

Asked by Mr Justice Hardiman if she could state the point which she wished to have referred to the Supreme Court in a single phrase or sentence, solicitor Anne Fitzgibbon said essentially it was the decision of the appeal court in its 2010 judgement involving a point on the rule against the “contradiction of collateral matters”.

The rule refers to the finality of answers given by a witness under cross-examination at trial to questions on their credibility.

In its 2010 judgement, the appeal court found the only conceivable basis on which Mr McClean might have been cross-examined were on questions that went to his credibility. The court found this was a “collateral” issue and it seemed quite clear in law the answer would have been binding on the cross-examiner and could have been taken no further.

Ms Fitzgibbon submitted that the way the court applied that rule served to “second guess” the questions that might have been asked of the witness at the trial, the answers he may have given and his demeanour.

She submitted that if the defence had the suspect antecedent forms at an earlier stage, they could have asked questions which might have provided useful answers or alternatively might have provided leads.

Ms Fitzgibbon told the court Nevin still maintains she had no hand, act or part in her husband’s murder.

Counsel for the State, Tom O’Connell SC, said the appeal court, having examined 140 of the suspect antecedent history forms, had concluded that none of them were of any evidential value and they were in effect based on hearsay and opinion. He told the court that the rule of evidence as to the finality of answers given to questions going to credibility as been settled for several centuries.

Nevin, who appeared before the court wearing a white blouse, black cardigan and black trousers, made little reaction to the judgement of the court.

She had sought to bring her case before the Supreme Court on the basis that it raises points of law of exceptional public importance and that it is in the public interest that these should be decided on by the Supreme Court.