HE British government had detailed intelligence reports outlining the tactics and capabilities of the IRA before the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising, according to confidential cabinet papers released yesterday.
On the advice of the then British Home Secretary, Mr Roy Jenkins, the Labour government under Mr Harold Wilson was told in 1966 that the Northern Ireland government and Scotland Yard were "particularly concerned" about the possible threat of IRA violence during the commemoration of the Rising.
The six page report, which was presented to the government 10 days before the Easter weekend, detailed "the real threat" of IRA violence which Mr Jenkins suggested was supported by a Scotland Yard estimate that "3,000 trained members or supporters could be called out in an emergency". These "supporters", he told the Cabinet, were engaged in military training in "various places" in Ireland and were "adequately supplied" with arms and ammunition.
In the week before the Easter Rising anniversary, the document noted that the Northern Ireland government was afraid the IRA would "attempt to foment sectarian troubles, necessitating the intervention of the police," which Mr Wilson was particularly keen to avoid. His instincts told him, especially in the early 1960s, that the British should pull out of Northern Ireland - although this idea had already been rejected, before the deployment of troops on the streets in August 1969.
The apprehension felt by Mr Wilson and his government in April 1966 was set against the background of increased security at RUC stations on the Border in anticipation of IRA activity on the weekend of April 16th and 17th.
Plans had been made for the military support of the RUC, "if needed," the Home Secretary noted. But the British government was concerned not to allow the IRA to publicise any clashes as "a people's uprising against the excesses of the Crown forces".
Mr Wilson accepted this assessment of the IRA threat and agreed a "special system" established by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) would be brought into effect if terrorist attacks were launched on gas or electricity stations. The system would relay reports of incidents and information about possible targets to the MoD who believed, as did Scotland Yard, that IRA agents might attempt to sabotage public or military installations.
The weekend following the Easter Rising commemoration was regarded as "an acute danger period" by the British government, not only because of the worries concerning the IRA but because it coincided with the decision to send an additional infantry battalion "ostensibly for training" to Northern Ireland.
THE report recommended caution: "We hope that this move will not attract due publicity, especially as it is most important to avoid any accusation that by deciding to move troops to Northern Ireland we have provoked incidents that might otherwise not have occurred."
This view was supported by a memo on April 13th written by an "anxious" MoD official who said moving the troops would "lay us open to blame of provocation of any disturbance or violence that might follow".
The British Home Office should be aware of the situation, he wrote, "so that a satisfactory explanation could be prepared especially as there would now be an Ulster Labour member (Mr Gerry Fitt) in the House . .. and there is nothing that would stop people blaming us if such a situation should arise".
The cabinet report concluded there were "two bright spots to this gloomy picture", noting that there had been no serious outbreaks of violence in Northern Ireland so far that year: the election period, "unlike the last", had passed off quietly in the North and the British government was cheered by the "growing evidence of the Republican Government's desire to take a firm stand against the IRA lawlessness and to co operate with the Northern Ireland authorities".
According to secret Ministry of Defence papers, the British government began planning its "internal security reinforcement of Northern Ireland" in March 1996 in response to the threat of "serious political disturbances" during the commemoration period.
In a memo marked "secret", the British government's response to such a threat was outlined in detail. "Assuming a four day warning period, air movement of reinforcements would be completed in 26 hours, using 16 aircraft, and sea lifts in four days," it states. Additional weaponry and officers would also be on standby.
Intelligence information gathered during late 1965 revealed the extent of the IRA threat. In a letter marked "secret" and dated December 9th, 1965, the then Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Capt Terence O'Neill, described in detail the IRA's training techniques in Ireland and asked the British government to "express their deep concern" over these "clandestine and illegal" activities to the Irish government.
The letter, which was addressed to Sir Frank Soskice QC, the then Secretary of State for the Home Office, listed 34 IRA camps in Ireland, 17 of which had been established since August 1965.
"Some of these have been conducted fairly openly and the sound of firing has been audible over a wide area. Instruction at these sessions has included live firing practice, lectures on the use of explosives and the making of booby traps and advice on the mounting of attacks on government buildings," he wrote.
In particular, Capt O'Neill highlighted 12 counties and several key areas within them: these included Drimoleague, Co Cork; Glencolumbkille in Co Donegal; Waterville in Co Kerry; and Navan and Oldcastle in Co Meath.
"It will be seen how widespread this activity has been, particularly in areas close to the Border. It is difficult to appreciate how such preparations could possibly be made without the knowledge of the police and the authorities in the Republic," he wrote.
In order to curtail these activities, Capt O'Neill suggested that the British government "expresses to the Irish government the deep concern which is felt about these preparations and seek the assistance of that government in effectively supressing clandestine illegal activities conducted within its jurisdiction and in taking strong action against those who seek refuge in the Republic."