THE author is the Defence Correspondent of the London Independent. His wide ranging book covers the present and future of UN forces, "non lethal" weapons, genetic engineering, drugs, mercenaries etc. He acknowledges help from official sources it is sometimes unclear whether the ideas put forward are his own or official ones. But the book makes one reconsider some accepted ideas.
Bosnia is covered, without mentioning the shelling of Sarajevo, or the controversy about its unhindered continuance odd omissions. There are only a few references to a "siege". He says that the British UN commanders were following the inexorable flow of events". One cannot help wondering if this was a policy, or a justification constructed in hindsight.
The legality of intervention in another state's internal affairs is discussed. In 1991, the satellite pictures of frightened Kurds climbing the snow covered slopes of northern Iraq went into Western homes, over the heads of generals, diplomats and governments. John Major to his great credit, proposed the concept of "safe havens". Mr Bellamy's account of the subsequent intervention is somewhat one sided. The size and speed of the US help to the Kurds is understated.
The then UN secretary general, Perez de Cuellar, said. "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents." One test for proposals to legalise such interventions would be if they were applied to the West Bank or South Lebanon.
Bellamy ignores the recent allegations that Unprofor commanders took their orders from London and Paris. He does say that the tardiness of intervention in Somalia and Bosnia was "mainly the fault of the UN member states, not the UN Secretariat", and that the UN and NATO Reaction Forces were not "rapid" at all.
"Furthermore, reliance on national contingents, reporting... to their own governments as well as to a UN or other multinational commander compromises the UN's authority and the impartiality of the force". Who does such reprehensible things? Would you believe, the Italians in Somalia?
Bellamy says that British troops "shot hundreds" of Croats. This may have been necessary in self defence but why do we only hear of it now? He includes a proposal for a permanent UN force, comparative tables of the "Principles of War and Peace through the Ages" (including his own suggestions to meet the new situation), military requirements for "Sale Havens", the Russian failures in Chechnya, the British concept of "wider peacekeeping", etc. He has a good chapter on the "Causes of Conflict"
In this he shares a curious blank spot with Sir Michael Howard and other writers from the bigger countries there is no mention of occupation as a cause of conflict.
This may be a willed amnesia in countries whose troops have occupied other lands in the past. But history, as recently as the Palestinian Intifada, South Lebanon and Kuwait, shows that occupation will provoke resistance indeed, resistance in such cases is self defence legitimised by the UN Charter.
On officer careers, Bellamycommends attachment to an aid agency, and say the Irish Army, heavily involved in UN operations, currently has such a scheme, and other states' armed forces will probably develop similar ideas".
Despite the criticisms, it is clear that peacekeeping is evolving rapidly. Serious thought is being given to it by other defence forces and discussed through organisations such as the "Partnership for Peace".
We could find ourselves out of date and out in the cold. {CORRECTION} 96081400040
