In the midst of the media obsession with IRA decommissioning, several historical breakthroughs in the past few days are being almost totally missed.

The first was David Trimble's assurance to nationalists in his Monday statement that "the UUP recognises and accepts that it is legitimate for nationalists to pursue their political objective of a united Ireland."

On December 15th, 1993, in the Downing Street Declaration, the British government accepted for the first time that the nationalist aspiration for a united Ireland was of equal value to the unionist viewpoint. It was a hugely important reason for the IRA ceasefire a few months later. In a seismic shift the unionists have now also accepted this reality.

The significance of the Trimble statement has not been lost on the IRA. In the same way that the British government declaration of December 1993 allowed movement on a ceasefire, the Trimble statement was enormously important for the latest IRA move.

When both the British and the unionists have come to accept the legitimacy of the pursuit of a united Ireland, it provides an enormous fillip to those within republicanism arguing for a political rather than a military approach.

Thus the Gerry Adams statement of Monday that his party was "totally opposed to any use of force, or threat of force, by others for any political purpose" was an obvious next step but none the less also truly remarkable. It has also received short shrift in media besotted with decommissioning.

There is the final and irrevocable commitment to the political way by the leader of an organisation, an arm of which fought a bloody 30-year battle to force a united Ireland. Put succinctly, the Sinn Fein leader is rejecting violence for political ends. Who ever thought those words could be written?

In its own words yesterday the IRA statement also affirms that different direction. It says the Good Friday agreement is "a significant development, and we believe its full implementation will contribute to the achievement of a lasting peace." Those words of approval represent the first IRA direct commentary on the Belfast Agreement and are very important for that reason.

The positive tone of the IRA statement makes it clear that it is now comfortable with the new Northern Ireland state which will hopefully come about as a result of the Belfast Agreement. It is a state where aspirations are treated equally, where nationalists are not second class and where North-South bodies and Sinn Fein ministers will prevent slippage back to the bad old ways. It is also one where the All-Ireland dimension can be created and improved on.

With the establishment of that state, it can be surmised decommissioning becomes far less of a political hot potato for republicans. It could well occur in the context of overall demilitarisation as the need for armed organisations, be it the British army, loyalist paramilitaries or the IRA, disappears.

There is no reason to believe the IRA will not live up to its obligations in this area. Both Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein are blessed by the lack of a coherent alternative in their internal opposition. "You can't beat something with nothing," as one American saying goes.

Sinn Fein and the IRA have undoubtedly stretched themselves these past few weeks. At times even the leadership began to despair of progress as the talks dragged on.

This is where ANC thinking was influential. The South African negotiators had long advised Sinn Fein to follow "a bush strategy" where the participants are removed from the normal surroundings, and in the case of the South African peace talks, when the two sides got away to the bush for fishing trips and discussions.

Sinn Fein's version of the bush turned out to be the palatial surroundings of the American embassy in London, where on two successive nights the breakthroughs occurred with the inspired help of Senator George Mitchell.

It was during an informal after-dinner conversation at Winfield House that the Sinn Fein negotiators finally believe they convinced the unionists that the IRA was not on the cusp of military defeat when it called its ceasefires. They were surprised to learn that the unionists had long privately believed that imminent military defeat was the real reason the republicans got involved in the peace process.

The reality that the IRA, rusty and depleted perhaps, could definitely regenerate itself if it all went horribly wrong was accepted by the unionists, and the notion of an ultimate victory was banished for ever.

For Sinn Fein, the acceptance of David Trimble as a "unionist visionary" came slowly but coalesced at those embassy meetings. The unionist mindset of deep suspicion of omnipotent leaders who make unilateral decisions for them was finally fully conveyed to Sinn Fein; it helped explain some of the more baffling decisions of unionism in the recent past.

Sometimes during the final phase of the talks the Sinn Fein negotiators felt they were not convincing Trimble as much as the men around him. After all, Trimble had signed up previously to a deal at Downing Street only to face withering criticism when he tried to sell it. Over the final weekend Sir Reg Empey, in particular, became a crucial figure who eventually sided with his party leader.

Sinn Fein believes the Ulster Unionists over-negotiated during last weekend, when they first dismissed the deal after just 20 minutes of discussion and David Trimble returned to tell George Mitchell the answer was No in the hopes of getting more movement.

The negative reaction to that move quickly convinced the unionists they had made a strategic error.

Thus, on Monday morning last, George Mitchell jokingly remarked that he well remembered President Clinton's back-handed compliment to him when he was last in Ireland. The President had reminded him of the country-and-western song I Got The Gold Mine And You Got The Shaft.

That was undoubtedly how the American chairman was feeling, until David Trimble walked back in and told him it was a go.

Suddenly it was history and not failure that was staring everyone in the face.