Conviction is growing that London and SF are engaged in serious talks

ON THE North's simple rule of thumb "if it is bad for them it is good for us" strains in the Conservative unionist relationship…

ON THE North's simple rule of thumb "if it is bad for them it is good for us" strains in the Conservative unionist relationship will be an encouragement to Dublin and the SDLP. Moreover, the conviction is growing in some quarters that the British government and Sinn Fein are engaged in serious negotiations about a renewed ceasefire.

The nine Ulster Unionist MPs brought Mr Major close to defeat in Wednesday's Commons vote. Sir Patrick Mayhew and Mr David Trimble had a reportedly "frosty" meeting on Thursday night. Relations between the Secretary of State and Ulster Unionist leader have further soured over beef.

The unionists were furious to discover that detailed plans for a herd certification scheme and accelerated cull had not, in fact been sent to Brussels. Given Northern Ireland's case for a fast track from the EU beef ban, and the prime minister's insistence on a "UK wide" policy, the UUP was bound to vote its domestic agenda.

Wednesday's majority of just one underlined the fragility of Mr Major's position. His failure to secure UUP support encouraged the opposition to predict more knife edged votes in the weeks to come. The unionists say they will approach them issue by issue. However, the attendant backdrop to all their decisions will be the British government's inclination as between the talks process and a revived peace bid. And the latest indications are that the UUP thinks it may be losing the argument.

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Mr Trimble does consider it a matter of choice. For weeks he has been pressing Mr Major for a statement defining the necessary "characteristics" of any new IRA ceasefire, and the conditions for Sinn Fein's entry into talks. In effect, he argues that the breakdown of, the first ceasefire requires a raising of the hurdle that Sinn Fein cannot meet the new conditions and that the real decision must be to proceed in the Stormont talks without them.

Dublin considers this off the wall. There the real choice is seen as between peace and an inclusive process, and no process and an inevitable return to war. Irish strategists do not dispute British assertions that the Provisionals are preparing for an escalation of conflict. But they assess the republican leadership as equally poised for a return to politics.

The objective criteria would suggest this is unlikely. The republicans claim the first ceasefire was hallmarked by British "bad faith". Unionism has moved significantly to the right. Months from an election, Mr Major would appear hard pressed to bring them into substantive negotiations. In any event, the talks will halt as the parties prepare for that election.

Many commentators think that combination will incline republicans to sustain the pressure and await the arrival of a new government in London.

However, the Irish assessment is that the republican leadership does not wish to go down that road that it recognises that escalating violence, with an inevitable loyalist response, carries the risk of a protracted and possibly uncontrollable phase of conflict which would extend well beyond the election and that those inclined to take the political route currently have ascendancy within the republican movement.

Hence Dublin pressure for a restatement of the British attitude to the talks process, amounting to a guarantee that Sinn Fein will win immediate access to an inclusive process in return for a second cessation and acceptance of the Mitchell principles. Sources say the talking is done and it is for Britain to decide. A package has been outlined which Dublin believes would restore the peace. .Crucially it requires Sir Patrick to bite on the bullet of Sinn Fein's automatic entry.

Various "life support systems" are suggested to avoid collapse in face of a unionist walk out. Intensive periods of bilateral talks could avoid the immediate need to bring all parties face to face. "Review periods" by both governments could meet republican calls for "indicative timetables" something technically built in to the legislation establishing the process.

Irish sources stress two things that the process itself will inevitably be long, messy and with no guarantee of a successful outcome, and their belief that the republican leadership wants to join the process.

Given Sinn Fein's own assessment, many analysts think a second ceasefire in current conditions must look an altogether less attractive, and more risky, proposition from a republican perspective.

If the Irish assessment is correct, Mr Major might consider it a potentially glittering prize.

Sir Patrick's performance in the Commons on Thursday gave the impression of a government keeping its options open. That is strengthened by indications from the UUP that they believe their demand for a tough statement on terms and conditions has been "kicked into the long grass". They "have apparently been told it would "fetter" the government's discretion and that an attempt to treat Sinn Fein differently within the process could leave them open to legal challenge.

In truth, it always seemed probable that Mr Trimble's latest play would fail. The Westminster arithmetic and volatile Conservative opinion may yet persuade Mr Major he has insufficient room for manoeuvre. But the original peace initiative changed the Northern Ireland question. At the very least, no British government will choose to exclude the possibility of peace.

And while ministers hate such press speculation, Sir Patrick's remarks in Manchester yesterday will have encouraged unionists to fear, and nationalists to hope, that the dance is back on.

Sir Patrick's speech was a direct and positive response to that of Mr Martin McGuinness on Thursday night. He agreed it was desirable that talks "should be inclusive of all parties". He insisted Britain was not seeking victory pledged commitment to "a comprehensive settlement" and cited the Joint Declaration and Framework Documents as evidence of the willingness of both governments to "take the lead".

Sir Patrick again said "deeds as well as words will be needed" by which to judge "an unequivocal restoration" of the ceasefire, and a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods. But significantly there appeared to be convergence with Mr McGuinness on the issue of decommissioning. Noting Mr McGuinness's view that it "must, without blocking progress, be dealt with to the satisfaction of all the participants in the process of negotiations", Sir Patrick said. "We say the way forward is for decommissioning to take place in accordance with the recommendations of the Mitchell Report."

The intended British message was that Mr McGuinness's words were received and seriously considered that if the Provisionals are serious London will not be standing in the way. However, the interest is attended by scepticism born of experience. Sir Patrick points up the principle of "consent" and says it is for Sinn Fein to find the words to persuade others of their intent. Dublin will wonder if Mr Trimble can ever be persuaded, and if his will be the last word.

London says not but struggles to find a formula which could bring Sinn Fein in without prompting a collective unionist walkout. And the emphatic message is that any further restatement of the British position will fall squarely within the confines of existing policy. For all that, it will be still more eagerly awaited.