ARCHBISHOP Desmond Connell's strong criticism of the Constitution Review Group on the public funding of religiously controlled hospitals is probably misplaced, though other aspects of the group's report may cause concern to religious believers.

Specifically, Dr Connell is concerned that the report appears to oppose public funding for hospitals which decline to perform lawful operations for religious reasons. In fairness, the manner in which the question is posed suggests unease on the part of group members about public funding for such hospitals.

However, in my opinion the actual recommendation from a majority of the review group would adequately safeguard the interests of religiously controlled hospitals. This majority called for an amendment of Article 44 to provide that religious institutions should not be debarred from public funding, provided that they do not discriminate on grounds of religious practice or belief, save where this can be shown to be necessary to maintain their own religious ethos.

Earlier in the report the group indicated that the existing constitutional ban on discrimination on grounds of religious profession, belief or status was, "broadly speaking, satisfactory". Taking these two points together, it would seem that a majority of the group does not support the withdrawal of public funding from religious institutions that refused to perform certain operations, provided that refusal is necessary to maintain the religious ethos of the institution in question.

Nor, indeed, does it seem possible to justify the withdrawal of public funding from religious institutions because of a refusal on religious grounds to provide lawful services. In the context of the debate on the propriety of public funding of religious institutions, an important distinction can be drawn between the public funding of an institution which uses such monies to promote religious objectives and the public funding of an institution which refuses to provide certain lawful services.

The element of coercion inherent in the first situation - using the taxes of non believers to finance projects which they oppose in conscience - requires, at a minimum, that such funding should be justified by a greater common good which can be framed in secular terms.

In the second situation, the element of coercion works in the opposite decision. Refusing to fund religious institution because it will not provide certain services constitutes an unacceptable interference with the conscientious beliefs of the members of that institution and may amount to religious discrimination.

If the State is anxious to ensure that such services are provided, the solution surely is to make the services available through other means, rather than to penalise those who conscientiously object to their provision. Thus, in the ward of court case the Supreme Court did not require the hospital caring for the patient to act in any manner contrary to its ethos, while still asserting the right of the State to order withdrawal of treatment.

FROM the Archbishop's perspective, there is a broader issue in the report which is likely to be a cause for concern - that the report arguably seeks to purge the Constitution of any religious flavour. This is particularly evident in its recommendations concerning the Preamble and Article 44.

While I would agree that the sectarian flavour of the Preamble should be removed, I wonder whether the removal of all religious influence from the Constitution is necessarily a good thing. Certainly, such a course of action would amount to a major shift in the philosophical foundations of our constitutional order.

Commenting on the Irish situation, Michael Perry, a leading US constitutional scholar, has argued that "the conclusion that merely in affirming Christianity the Irish Constitution violates a human right, or that in consequence Ireland falls short of being a full fledged liberal democracy, is implausible and, indeed, extreme".

Moreover, the dual philosophical bases of the present Constitution, liberal democracy and Christian democracy, arguably provides a constitutional framework which is conducive to balancing the interests of the individual with those of the wider community. Removing one of these philosophical influences, without putting anything in its place, may upset that balance with perhaps unforeseen consequences.

This is a large issue which one hopes will be properly debated - and in which the Archbishop's statement may be seen as an opening shot.