Base Sellafield's future on the facts

The same British expertise that is helping to deal with nuclear sites in eastern Europe is being applied today at Sellafield, …

The same British expertise that is helping to deal with nuclear sites in eastern Europe is being applied today at Sellafield, writes Stephen Timms

Let me begin by saying that I am sensitive to the sincerely-held views of most people in Ireland about Sellafield. What happens at Sellafield is of direct interest to everyone in Britain. I share many of those concerns. I too want a plant that is environmentally sound. I want a plant that is safe; safe for those that work there, as well as for all of us. And I want a plant that is secure.

On all of these things, we want the same thing. I am satisfied that the operation at Sellafield is all those things. I don't make that statement lightly.

The UK agencies and organisations charged with regulating the industry do so independently of government; these bodies oversee a robust system of checks and counter-balances. We adhere to exacting international standards for material accountancy throughout our civil nuclear programme, which inspectors from the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency regularly verify. Your own expert body, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, has consistently found that the low discharges from Sellafield pose no threat to human health.

READ MORE

I was particularly pleased the British government was able to announce recently that new technology has been introduced at Sellafield to further reduce discharges there. This shows our determination to ensure that Sellafield operates to the most rigorous environmental standards. Sellafield is not a radiological threat.

On security too, our views are very close. We all agree on the need for stringent security precautions to protect Sellafield from different types of terrorist attack. We are all acutely aware of the changed world we live in after the appalling attacks in the US in 2001, and other attacks since then, most recently in Madrid. We already had a system in place before the 9/11 atrocity, designed on the principle of defence in depth: a multi-layered approach to security, constantly under review and updated. Since then the British government has further comprehensively reviewed the security measures at Sellafield. It goes without saying that access to those detailed plans is tightly controlled. It has to be. It is not possible to share security sensitive information widely, and to maintain the integrity of those plans.

Where we disagree, we need a greater degree of understanding of the issues. The immediate closure of Sellafield would solve nothing. The site, and some of the facilities, date back to the dawn of the nuclear age. Parts of the site are more than 50 years old. We cannot simply wish these legacy issues away. They need to be dealt with. And they are being dealt with.

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority is being set up by the British government to take charge of cleaning-up Sellafield. The same British expertise and technology that is helping to deal with nuclear sites in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is being applied today at Sellafield.

I recognise that many people want to accelerate the decommissioning programme at Sellafield. But the fact is it will take time. Most importantly, we must ensure that the process is done to the highest environmental and safety standards.

That is how it must be.

Part of that process will be telling people what is happening, and why. A dialogue involving all stakeholders, including in Ireland, is vital. My officials have already undertaken a great deal of consultation in Ireland about decommissioning. There are a great many other contacts between our two governments on Sellafield.

Our regulators (the Environment Agency, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the Food Standards Agency) meet and talk regularly to the RPII. Officials also meet and speak regularly. Our ambassador in Dublin keeps in close touch with Irish Ministers and senior officials over a range of Sellafield issues.

Yet confusion and suspicion still arise. We all need to do more to minimise those occasions. I deeply regret that Ireland felt it necessary to bring the two court cases against Britain in respect of Sellafield. One case was dismissed; the other suspended pending the outcome of proceedings brought by the Commission against Ireland in the European Court of Justice.

In the second case, the tribunal welcomed Britain's offer to Ireland to review the arrangements in place for co-operating over Sellafield. Those talks are ongoing, but I hope soon that they will bear fruit.

So, it is important that we set the issues in the proper context. By all means let's have a debate about the future of Sellafield. But let us do so on the basis of good science and the facts.

Stephen Timms MP is minister of state for energy, e-commerce and postal services at the British Department of Trade and Industry