Five years ago today, 72 people died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Britain watched in horror as flames engulfed a social housing block in one of the richest areas of the country, and many knew that this disaster was much more than a freak accident.
In the days following the fire, residents spoke out about the dangerous conditions they were living in, and how their safety concerns had been brushed away by the building’s owner, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), and its managing agent, Kensington and Chelsea tenant management organisation (KCTMO).
In the five years since the fire, the ongoing Grenfell Tower inquiry has examined in forensic detail the web of individual, corporate and governmental failures that led to one of the worst disasters in modern British history. Residents who feared that their safety and wellbeing had been disregarded have repeatedly been vindicated. The wider public should be aware of the details of the inquiry: it not only tells the story of a wholly preventable tragedy in modern-day Britain, it tells us it could easily be repeated.
Phase one of the inquiry, which took place over the second half of 2018, examined what happened on the night of the fire. It returned the crucial finding that the cladding installed on the tower as part of a refurbishment in 2015-16 was the primary cause of the fire’s spread. The inquiry also painted a vivid picture of the chaos on the ground on the night of the fire, with the London fire brigade (LFB) coming under fierce criticism for the length of time it took to revoke its “stay put” strategy and begin evacuating residents.
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Phase two of the inquiry, which started in January 2020, is currently building up a decades-long picture of how the tower came to end up in such an unsafe condition in the first place. In doing so, it has exposed incompetence and malpractice within the UK construction industry, housing sector, fire service and government, at both a local and national level.
First we learned about the shocking lack of knowledge and regard for safety among the architects, builders and specialist contractors involved in the 2015-16 refurbishment of the tower. A decision was taken by this team to switch the building’s cladding from zinc to plastic-filled aluminium composite material (ACM) to cut costs. Austerity measures meant the council inspector responsible for approving the refurbishment was handling 130 projects at once.
Then the inquiry focused on product manufacturers responsible for making the cladding and insulation used on the tower. We learned that the firm Arconic had testing carried out in 2004 showing its cladding performing disastrously in a fire, but didn’t share these results with the product’s certifiers. Under questioning, the chief executive of the firm admitted the omission amounted to a “misleading half truth”. However, the firm’s lawyers later took back this admission, blaming the language barrier between the inquiry’s lawyers and the firm’s French CEO.
Meanwhile, a former employee of the insulation manufacturer Celotex claimed the firm “rigged” a fire test to achieve better fire performance. The inquiry was also shown texts exchanged by employees of the insulation giant Kingspan joking about the “lies” in their company’s marketing material. Both firms have condemned the actions of individual employees, but maintain that they did not deliberately rig tests.
As the inquiry’s focus shifted to RBKC and its tenant management organisation, we learned that both apparently failed in their duty to maintain the tower. By 2017, KCTMO had built a backlog of hundreds of incomplete maintenance jobs arising from fire risk assessments. RBKC rejected a recommendation from the London fire brigade to repair and inspect fire doors in the borough due to budget concerns. Important fire safety equipment was not working at Grenfell on the night of the fire and broken fire doors allowed smoke to spread easily through the building.
The LFB has also not escaped further scrutiny under phase two of the inquiry. We learned how the brigade failed to learn from previous disasters, most notably the 2009 Lakanal House fire, and to prepare for an event like Grenfell, despite being aware of growing concerns around poorly constructed high-rise blocks.
RBKC, KCTMO and the London fire brigade have all apologised for the role they played in the Grenfell tragedy.
However, witnesses from these organisations have often sought to put their decisions within the context of government-mandated budget constraints at the time.
When the civil servants and ministers responsible for fire safety in the years before Grenfell were finally put under the microscope in March this year, we learned how successive governments since the 1990s failed to get a grip of Britain’s growing fire safety crisis. New Labour failed to publish fire tests carried out in the early 2000s that showed the risk of aluminium composite material. A deregulation drive under David Cameron meant civil servants failed to push through important amendments to the building regulations.
Now in its 77th week, the second phase of the inquiry has just examined the immediate aftermath of the fire, illustrating how the residents of Grenfell continued to be failed by the state in the weeks after the blaze.
Over the past five years the inquiry has uncovered an unbelievable amount of evidence about the corporate, legal and governmental structures that allowed 72 people to die in a completely preventable disaster. However, this evidence does not mean anything if it doesn’t lead to real change.
Survivors, former residents and the bereaved of Grenfell Tower have campaigned tirelessly to ensure this tragedy isn’t repeated. Last week an important milestone was met when the government published its long-awaited social housing regulation Bill, which will massively strengthen the regulation of social landlords.
However, the pace of change has been painfully slow. The British government is yet to implement the majority of the recommendations from phase one of the inquiry, and recently announced that it would be rejecting a key recommendation that building owners prepare personal evacuation plans for disabled residents.
Meanwhile, there are still 111 high-rise buildings with aluminium composite material cladding across England where remediation work is yet to be completed, while thousands of people are still living in flats with other types of dangerous cladding and safety defects.
Five years on, the Grenfell tragedy continues to hold an important place in our collective memory. Whether it becomes a true turning point remains to be seen. — Guardian