Ten years ago, Saddam Hussein, after some unwise provocation from Kuwait, put himself and Iraq in the wrong by invading on August 2nd, 1990.
To expel the Iraqis, America's Gen Norman Schwarzkopf wanted a huge force. The timing was right. US diplomacy, fear of Saddam Hussein and the break-up of the Warsaw Pact caused 40 countries to supply over 700,000 troops.
The build-up took nearly six months and included over 1,650 aircraft and 174 warships. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Germany and Japan paid most of the costs.
After a five-week air assault the ground attack started on February 24th, 1991. A ceasefire was called after 100 hours, on February 28th.
For the Allies, the Gulf War was a US-led multinational enforcement operation, legitimised by UN resolutions. It was not a UN operation, but it could not have been run without US leadership and resources.
Iraq had learnt much from the Russians about anti-tank obstacles, sited in depth. But in the open desert, against air supremacy and "carpet-bombing", any ground defences were vulnerable.
Vietnam could not be repeated in a desert. In fact, Iraq had far fewer men in Kuwait than was thought. President Saddam had hoped that his troops would emerge from their bunkers and thin out the advancing attackers. This ignored air power and the new weapons such as fuel-air-explosive bombs. These release a mist of ignitable, fuel which explodes, burning oxygen out of the air, and creating overpressures and shock-waves to detonate minefields.
The cruise missiles that hit Baghdad were really small unmanned aircraft with built-in computers, explosive warheads and TV cameras. Cruise successes have been emphasised, but there were failures: 85 per cent target hits have been quoted. A US report, declassified in 1998, soberly says "the effectiveness of air power was more limited than initially expected or subsequently claimed". Nevertheless, the "100-hour ground war" speaks for itself.
Iraq's Scud B missile ranges were doubled by reducing the warhead explosive by 75 per cent. Riyadh and Tel Aviv could be, and were, hit. Aharon Levran, a shrewd Israeli commentator, has analysed the Scud attacks in his Israeli Strategy After Desert Storm.
Commentators seem agreed that 40 Scuds were launched against Israel in 17 attacks. Only seven of the attacks caused loss of life and severe material damage but the attacks were "traumatic for most Israelis". They were more used to bombarding Arab cities.
Zeev and Ya'ari, two Israeli writers, show that west Beirut took 127 Israeli air sorties and a naval missile bombardment on one day during Gen Sharon's two-month siege in 1982. Eight years earlier thousands of Palestinian women and children cowered in weak shelters.
Israel demanded permission to send bombers and commandos via Jordan and Saudi Arabia. President Bush gave them Patriot missiles, but forbade Israeli intervention to avoid disrupting the Alliance.
Gen Schwarzkopf says that the Scud-hunt distracted his forces. After failing to get a staff officer into the HQ the Israelis sent a bombing list. The US air force found it was bombing empty sand-dunes. Eventually Saddam ran out of Scuds.
Israelis denigrate the Patriot air defence system. How much of that is just pressure on the US and how much is genuinely professionally based is not clear.
Senior British officers, such as Gen de la Billiere, have been frank about equipment problems, both in his Gulf War book and his memoirs. Lynx helicopter engines, Challenger tank power packs, etc., all figured. He was also critical of the RAF low-level attack tactics, which caused losses and were quickly abandoned. But even Mrs Thatcher queried these.
Gen Schwarzkopf was a "reading general" who knew military history. He knew that attacks across open country against well-prepared troops could be bloody failures. However, the direction of an attack could be concealed by a sound deception plan - and air superiority.
Warships carrying marines rehearsed beach landings. Then Gen Schwarzkopf swung 250,000 troops and their vehicles and tanks in a huge left hook around the Iraqi defended area. Dummy radio traffic indicated that they had not moved. The results have often been described.
Captured Iraqi operations rooms showed preparations for beach landings that never came. It was all over in 100 hours, on February 28th, 1991.
There has been criticism of President Bush's humane decision to stop on February 28th. But, as Gen Schwarzkopf mentions, the British and French were already asking questions on February 27th. The early London Times leader on February 28th was headed "When to Stop" and said "enough is enough". That was the reaction of many people in reading about the carnage on Mutlah Ridge. The British government did not dissent.